基于麦克斯韦密码系统的后量子可消毒签名方案
Post-Quantum Sanitizable Signatures from McEliece-Based Chameleon Hashing
AI总结：
本文提出基于麦克斯韦密码系统的后量子可消毒签名方案，通过混沌哈希函数实现可控碰撞查找，确保消息块可修改而其他内容不可变，并提供透明性保障。
摘要：
我们介绍了一种新型的后量子可消毒签名方案，该方案基于从麦克斯韦密码系统中衍生出的混沌哈希函数。在此设计中，指定的消毒剂具有Goppa码的固有陷阱门，这使得通过Patterson解码实现受控碰撞查找成为可能。该机制使授权人员能够修改特定的消息块，同时确保其他内容保持不可变地绑定。我们提供了正式的安全性定义和严格的存在不可伪造性和不可变性的证明，基于随机预言模型中syndrome解码的难度，其中一个稳健的随机预言阻止了平凡的线性哈希碰撞。关键的创新点在于我们对透明性属性的精确表征：通过在签名人生成的随机化器上施加特定的重量约束，我们实现了完美的透明性，使消毒后的签名与新鲜签名无法区分。这项工作建立了首个透明、基于代码的后量子可消毒签名方案，提供了强理论保证，并为长期安全应用的实用部署提供了路径。
英文摘要：
We introduce a novel post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme constructed upon a chameleon hash function derived from the McEliece cryptosystem. In this design, the designated sanitizer possesses the inherent trapdoor of a Goppa code, which facilitates controlled collision-finding via Patterson decoding. This mechanism enables authorized modification of specific message blocks while ensuring all other content remains immutably bound. We provide formal security definitions and rigorous proofs of existential unforgeability and immutability, grounded in the hardness of syndrome decoding in the random-oracle model, where a robust random oracle thwarts trivial linear hash collisions. A key innovation lies in our precise characterization of the transparency property: by imposing a specific weight constraint on the randomizers generated by the signer, we achieve perfect transparency, rendering sanitized signatures indistinguishable from freshly signed ones. This work establishes the first transparent, code-based, post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme, offering strong theoretical guarantees and a pathway for practical deployment in long-term secure applications.
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