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arXiv 2602.20518econ.THcs.GT
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重新审视单一行为体假设:迈向战略研究中个体偏好的现实聚合

Revisiting the Unitary Actor Assumption: Toward Realistic Aggregation of Individual Preferences in Strategy Research

Felipe A. Csaszar, John C. Eklund

AI总结:

本文提出一个数学框架,通过随机效用模型和聚合结构推导组织效用函数,揭示聚合结构对组织决策的影响,并在竞争与委托-代理场景中展示其战略意义。

摘要:

长期以来,战略研究中将企业视为具有一致偏好的单一实体的单一行为体假设忽略了组织是由具有多样且常常冲突目标的个体组成的联盟。尽管行为视角已挑战了这一假设,但该领域缺乏一种操作方法,用于从成员的多样化偏好和特定的聚合结构中推导出组织效用函数。我们开发了一个数学框架,该框架(i)通过随机效用模型将个体效用函数映射到选择概率,(ii)使用显式聚合结构(例如,全体一致或多元民主)结合这些概率,(iii)恢复一个能合理解释集体行为的组织效用函数。这使组织效用函数成为操作上有意义的:它们总结和预测组织选择,但通常不是成员效用的简单平均。相反,聚合结构系统地重塑偏好——全体一致近似于底层效用函数的点wise最小值,放大风险厌恶;多元民主近似于点wise最大值,促进风险寻求。我们通过Cournot竞争和委托-代理设置展示了战略影响,展示了内部聚合结构如何改变竞争和合作结果。总体而言,该框架提供了一种简洁的方法,将单一行为体模型与基于行为的组织偏好相结合,调和了企业联盟观点与严谨且可操作的战略分析。

英文摘要:

The long-standing unitary-actor assumption in strategy research -- treating firms as monolithic entities with coherent preferences -- misses that organizations are coalitions of individuals with diverse and often conflicting goals. Although behavioral perspectives have challenged this assumption, the field lacks an operational method for deriving an organizational utility function from the disparate preferences of its members and the specific structures used to aggregate them. We develop a mathematical framework that (i) maps individual utility functions into choice probabilities via a random-utility model, (ii) combines those probabilities using an explicit aggregation structure (e.g., unanimity or polyarchy), and (iii) recovers an organizational utility function that rationalizes the collective behavior. This establishes organizational utility functions as operationally meaningful: they summarize and predict organizational choice, yet are generally not simple averages of members' utilities. Instead, aggregation structures systematically reshape preferences -- unanimity approximates the pointwise minima of underlying utility functions, amplifying risk aversion; polyarchy approximates the pointwise maxima, promoting risk-seeking. We illustrate strategic implications in Cournot competition and principal-agent settings, showing how internal aggregation structures shift competitive and collaborative outcomes. Overall, the framework provides a parsimonious way to retrofit unitary-actor models with behaviorally grounded organizational preferences, reconciling the coalition view of the firm with rigorous and tractable strategic analysis.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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