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arXiv 2602.19783econ.GNq-fin.EC
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双面技术进步与人类及聊天机器人教育的军备竞赛

Janus-Faced Technological Progress and the Arms Race in the Education of Humans and Chatbots

Corvinus University of Budapest(布达佩斯考文纽斯大学);Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy(马克斯·普朗克社会法与社会政策研究所)

Wolfgang Kuhle

AI总结:

本文研究了技术进步与对数正态工资分布如何导致人类和聊天机器人陷入低效教育军备竞赛,并探讨了其对GDP、不平等和福利的影响。

摘要:

我们研究了在技术进步与对数正态工资分布相结合的情况下,促使代理人陷入低效教育军备竞赛的条件。我们的模型强调,对数正态工资分布意味着代理人的工资随着技能水平和技术水平的增加而呈指数增长。反过来,这种技能、技术和工资之间的指数关系会迫使代理人陷入经济技能分布尾部的疲惫竞赛。此外,技术进步和教育过度投资会增加GDP和不平等,而福利可能下降。在另一种解释中,我们的模型研究了投资于聊天机器人和AI代理的人工智能公司。在广泛的规范范围内,公司,就像人类一样,有激励选择边角解,其中投资仅受借贷约束限制。

英文摘要:

We study the conditions under which technological advances, in combination with a lognormal wage distribution, incentivize agents into an inefficient educational arms race. Our model emphasizes that lognormal wage distributions imply that agents' wages increase exponentially in the level of their skill as well as in the level of technology. In turn, this exponential relation between skills, technology, and wages pressures agents into an exhausting race for the tails of the economy's skill distribution. Moreover, technological advances and overinvestment in education increase GDP and inequality, while welfare may decline. In an alternative interpretation, our model studies firms that invest in artificial intelligence of their chatbots and AI agents. For a wide range of specifications, firms, just like humans, have an incentive to choose corner solutions where investment is limited only by borrowing constraints.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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