轨道升级:利用博弈论建模卫星勒索软件攻击
Orbital Escalation: Modeling Satellite Ransomware Attacks Using Game Theory
AI总结:
本文提出基于博弈论的轨道升级模型,用于分析卫星勒索软件攻击中的攻防策略,通过动态规划确定最优防御策略和攻击收益。
摘要:
勒索软件尚未达到轨道,但此类攻击的条件已经存在。本文提出了首个基于博弈论的框架,用于建模针对卫星的勒索软件攻击:轨道升级博弈。在该模型中,攻击者在轨道通过过程中逐步升级赎金要求,而防守方则选择其最佳策略,例如尝试恢复操作。利用动态规划,我们解决了防守方的最优策略以及攻击者在真实轨道约束下的预期收益。此外,我们提供了一个GPS III卫星案例研究,展示了我们的轨道升级博弈如何在虚构但可行的勒索软件攻击情境中应用,以推导每一步的最佳策略。结论是,这一基础模型为卫星所有者、政策制定者和研究人员提供了一个正式框架,以更好地准备当航天器被勒索时的应对措施。
英文摘要:
Ransomware has yet to reach orbit, but the conditions for such an attack already exist. This paper presents the first game-theoretic framework for modeling ransomware against satellites: the orbital escalation game. In this model, the attacker escalates ransom demands across orbital passes, while the defender chooses their best strategy, e.g., attempt a restore procedure. Using dynamic programming, we solve the defender's optimal strategy and the attacker's expected payoff under real orbital constraints. Additionally, we provide a GPS III satellite case study that demonstrates how our orbital escalation game can be applied in the context of a fictional but feasible ransomware attack to derive the best strategies at every step. In conclusion, this foundational model offers satellite owners, policy makers and researchers, a formal framework to better prepare their responses when a spacecraft is held for ransom.
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