Frontier LLMs are safeguarded against attempts to extract harmful information via adversarial prompts known as "jailbreaks". Recently, defenders have developed classifier-based systems that have survived thousands of hours of human red teaming. We introduce Boundary Point Jailbreaking (BPJ), a new class of automated jailbreak attacks that evade the strongest industry-deployed safeguards. Unlike previous attacks that rely on white/grey-box assumptions (such as classifier scores or gradients) or libraries of existing jailbreaks, BPJ is fully black-box and uses only a single bit of information per query: whether or not the classifier flags the interaction. To achieve this, BPJ addresses the core difficulty in optimising attacks against robust real-world defences: evaluating whether a proposed modification to an attack is an improvement. Instead of directly trying to learn an attack for a target harmful string, BPJ converts the string into a curriculum of intermediate attack targets and then actively selects evaluation points that best detect small changes in attack strength ("boundary points"). We believe BPJ is the first fully automated attack algorithm that succeeds in developing universal jailbreaks against Constitutional Classifiers, as well as the first automated attack algorithm that succeeds against GPT-5's input classifier without relying on human attack seeds. BPJ is difficult to defend against in individual interactions but incurs many flags during optimisation, suggesting that effective defence requires supplementing single-interaction methods with batch-level monitoring.
Scalable Defense against In-the-wild Jailbreaking Attacks with Safety Context Retrieval
School of EECS, Peking University(电子工程系,北京大学);School of Mathematical Sciences, Peking University(数学系,北京大学);State Key Lab of General Artificial Intelligence, School of Intelligence Science and Technology, Peking University(通用人工智能国家重点实验室,智能科学与技术学校,北京大学);Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University(人工智能研究院,北京大学)
Speechmatics(Speechmatics公司);MATS(机器学习对齐理论与实验项目(注:MATS全称为Machine Learning Alignment Theory and Experiments,为独立研究机构,此处保留缩写并补充说明));UCL(伦敦大学学院);Stanford University(斯坦福大学);University of Oxford(牛津大学);Tangentic(Tangentic公司);Anthropic(Anthropic公司)
Jailbreaking LLMs' Safeguard with Universal Magic Words for Text Embedding Models
Dept. of Comp. Sci. and Tech., Inst. for AI, Tsinghua-Bosch Joint ML Center, THBI Lab, BNRist Center, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China(计算机科学与技术系、人工智能研究所、清华-博世联合机器学习中心、THBI实验室、BNRist中心、清华大学、北京);Department of Mathematical Sciences, Tsinghua University(数学科学系、清华大学);BIMSA, Beijing, China(BIMSA、北京、中国)
JailbreakZoo: Survey, Landscapes, and Horizons in Jailbreaking Large Language and Vision-Language Models
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校);Brown University(布朗大学);University of Michigan Ann Arbor(密歇根大学安娜堡分校);Hong Kong University of Science and Technology(香港科学与技术大学);Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学);Boise State University(博伊西州立大学)
Fuzz-Testing Meets LLM-Based Agents: An Automated and Efficient Framework for Jailbreaking Text-To-Image Generation Models
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University(山东大学网络科学与技术学院);Netflix Eyeline Studios;State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Shandong University(山东大学密码与数字经济安全国家重点实验室);Shandong Key Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence Security, Shandong University(山东省人工智能安全重点实验室)
GUARD: Role-playing to Generate Natural-language Jailbreakings to Test Guideline Adherence of Large Language Models
School of Information Sciences University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign(信息科学学院伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校);Independent Researcher, Starc Institute(Starc研究所独立研究者);Computer Science and Engineering HKUST(HKUST计算机科学与工程学院);Computer Science Lapis Labs University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign(计算机科学Lapis Labs伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校);School of Information Sciences University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign(信息科学学院伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校)