arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2602.14223cs.GTq-fin.RM
收藏

P2P保险中的帕累托与波利游戏

Pareto and Bowley Reinsurance Games in Peer-to-Peer Insurance

The University of Hong Kong(香港大学);The Ohio State University(俄亥俄州立大学);Université Laval(拉瓦尔大学)

Tim J. Boonen, Kenneth Tsz Hin Ng, Tak Wa Ng, Thai Nguyen

AI总结:

本文提出P2P保险中的帕累托与波利博弈设计,通过分析两种合同机制,证明波利设计通常导致总福利较低,而帕累托设计在特定条件下能提升福利。

摘要:

我们提出了一种peer-to-peer(P2P)保险方案,包括一个风险分摊池和再保险人。计划管理者决定如何在成员之间分配风险并将其转交给再保险人,而再保险人则设定再保险附加费率。我们的研究聚焦于计划管理者和再保险人之间的战略互动,并由此得出两种博弈论合同设计:帕累托设计和波利设计,我们推导出闭式最优合同。在帕累托设计中,再保险人和计划管理者之间的合作导致多个帕累托最优合同,这些合同通过引入联盟稳定性的概念进一步细化。相比之下,波利设计通过领导者-追随者框架产生一个唯一的最优合同,我们通过支付向量的点wise比较提供了个体理性约束的严格验证。比较两种设计,我们证明波利最优合同从不帕累托最优,通常导致总福利较低。在我们的数值示例中,再保险的出现提高了福利,尤其是与帕累托设计和风险承受能力较低的再保险人相结合时。我们进一步分析了单一附加费率限制的影响,这种限制 disproportionately 倾向于风险损失较高的成员。

英文摘要:

We propose a peer-to-peer (P2P) insurance scheme comprising a risk-sharing pool and a reinsurer. A plan manager determines how risks are allocated among members and ceded to the reinsurer, while the reinsurer sets the reinsurance loading. Our work focuses on the strategic interaction between the plan manager and the reinsurer, and this focus leads to two game-theoretic contract designs: a Pareto design and a Bowley design, for which we derive closed-form optimal contracts. In the Pareto design, cooperation between the reinsurer and the plan manager leads to multiple Pareto-optimal contracts, which are further refined by introducing the notion of coalitional stability. In contrast, the Bowley design yields a unique optimal contract through a leader-follower framework, and we provide a rigorous verification of the individual rationality constraints via pointwise comparisons of payoff vectors. Comparing the two designs, we prove that the Bowley-optimal contract is never Pareto optimal and typically yields lower total welfare. In our numerical examples, the presence of reinsurance improves welfare, especially with Pareto designs and a less risk-averse reinsurer. We further analyze the impact of the single-loading restriction, which disproportionately favors members with riskier losses.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑