双边讨价还价中的买家承诺:以日本在线C2C市场为例
Buyer Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining: The Case of Online Japanese C2C Market
AI总结:
本文研究买家在谈判期间可继续寻找替代卖家时的讨价还价行为,发现明确承诺即时付款的买家更可能获得成交,减少违约并加快交易。文章构建了一个包含买家搜索和有限承诺的动态讨价还价模型,指出增加买家承诺可能降低总体福利。
摘要:
本文研究了在谈判期间买家可以继续寻找替代卖家时的讨价还价行为,发现明确承诺即时付款的买家更可能获得成交,减少违约并加快交易。文章构建了一个包含买家搜索和有限承诺的动态讨价还价模型,指出增加买家承诺可能降低总体福利。
英文摘要:
This paper studies bargaining when buyers can continue searching for alternative sellers while negotiating, which limits their commitment to complete a transaction. Using transaction level data from a Japanese online marketplace, I document frequent post-agreement nonpurchase and show that buyers who explicitly pledge immediate payment are more likely to have their offers accepted, renege less often, and complete transactions faster. I develop and estimate a dynamic bargaining model with buyer search and limited commitment. Counterfactuals that restrict search during bargaining show that increased buyer commitment can reduce total welfare. Sellers especially those with higher valuations benefit from the elimination of delays and walkaways and respond by raising list prices. This reduces buyer welfare by lowering the option value of search and increasing expected list prices. Platform revenue also declines because buyer behavior shifts away from counteroffers and negotiated prices fall.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。