跟踪追踪器：美国陆军网络上的商业监控
Tracking The Trackers: Commercial Surveillance Occurring on U.S. Army Networks
AI总结：
研究分析了美国陆军网络上存在的商业跟踪器，发现21%的访问域为跟踪器，建议通过网络配置和政策调整减少商业跟踪风险。
摘要：
尽管现有安全措施，DoD网络上的互联网活动仍易受网络跟踪器和商业数据收集的影响，可能暴露军人信息和单位操作。本报告记录了一项研究的结果，研究目的是表征陆军CONUS非机密网络上的网络跟踪情况。我们从Cloud-Based Internet Isolation (CBII)平台获取了数据集，涵盖2024年两个月期间测量的数据。该数据集包括1,000个最常访问的互联网资源，由CONUS DoDIN-A期间的连接请求数量确定。然后我们将数据集中的所有域名和子域名与Ghostery的WhoTracks.me开放数据库进行比较。我们发现，研究期间访问的域名中有超过21%是互联网跟踪器。ACI建议陆军对其企业网络进行调整，以限制基于互联网的商业跟踪，并采取相应的政策变更。通过相对较小的配置更改，CBII可以作为更有效的风险缓解措施，以应对商业可用信息带来的风险。
英文摘要：
Despite current security implementations, Internet activity on DoD networks is susceptible to web trackers and commercial data collection, which have the potential to expose information about service members and unit operations. This report documents the outcomes of a study to characterize web tracking occurring on Army CONUS unclassified networks. We derived a dataset from the Cloud-Based Internet Isolation (CBII) platform, encompassing data measured over a two-month period in 2024. This dataset comprised the 1,000 most frequently accessed Internet resources, determined by the number of connection requests on CONUS DoDIN-A during the study period. We then compared all domains and subdomains in the dataset against Ghostery's WhoTracks.me, an open-source database of commercial tracking entities. We found that over 21% of the domains accessed during the study period were Internet trackers. The ACI recommends that the Army implement changes to its enterprise networks to limit commercial Internet-based tracking, as well as policy changes towards the same end. With relatively minor configuration changes, CBII can serve as a more effective mitigation against risks posed by commercially available information.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
