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arXiv 2602.12104q-fin.MFmath.DSq-fin.TR
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去中心化金融中清算动态及交易费用的作用

Liquidation Dynamics in DeFi and the Role of Transaction Fees

Stevens Institute of Technology, School of Business(史蒂文斯理工学院商学院)

Agathe Sadeghi, Zachary Feinstein

AI总结:

本文研究了去中心化金融中清算动态及交易费用的作用,通过动态规划方法刻画最优清算策略,证明CPMM交易费用在保障安全性和补偿流动性提供者方面具有双重作用。

摘要:

在去中心化金融中,抵押品的清算是保障借贷协议偿付能力的主要保障措施。然而,清算机制本身使这些协议面临 predatory 价格操纵和其他形式的最大可提取价值(MEV)的威胁。本文从利润最大化清算者的角度出发,通过动态规划方法,刻画了最优清算策略,其中现货 oracle 由常产品市场maker(CPMM)给出。我们明确建模了 oracle 可提取价值(OEV),其中清算者通过 sandwich 攻击操纵 CPMM 以触发有利可图的清算事件。我们推导了闭式清算界限,并证明了 CPMM 交易费用是关键的安全参数。至关重要的是,我们证明费用不仅减少了攻击者的利润,而且可以使此类操纵对攻击者变得无利可图。我们的发现表明,CPMM 交易费用具有双重作用:补偿流动性提供者,并内生地使 CPMM oracle 对操纵具有抵抗力,而无需时间加权平均或中位化延迟。

英文摘要:

Liquidation of collateral are the primary safeguard for solvency of lending protocols in decentralized finance. However, the mechanics of liquidations expose these protocols to predatory price manipulations and other forms of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). In this paper, we characterize the optimal liquidation strategy, via a dynamic program, from the perspective of a profit-maximizing liquidator when the spot oracle is given by a Constant Product Market Maker (CPMM). We explicitly model Oracle Extractable Value (OEV) where liquidators manipulate the CPMM with sandwich attacks to trigger profitable liquidation events. We derive closed-form liquidation bounds and prove that CPMM transaction fees act as a critical security parameter. Crucially, we demonstrate that fees do not merely reduce attacker profits, but can make such manipulations unprofitable for an attacker. Our findings suggest that CPMM transaction fees serve a dual purpose: compensating liquidity providers and endogenously hardening CPMM oracles against manipulation without the latency of time-weighted averages or medianization.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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