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arXiv 2602.11330cs.GTcs.DS
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当代理自主选择组合时:超越偏差的保证

When agents choose bundles autonomously: guarantees beyond discrepancy

The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, HBNI(数学科学研究所,HBNI);Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur(印度理工学院乔德普尔分校);Ben-Gurion University of the Negev(内盖夫本-古里安大学)

Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Sanjay Seetharaman, Meirav Zehavi

AI总结:

研究提出了一种在多项式时间内实现高价值公平分配的方法,通过克服偏差障碍,为每个代理保证至少PROP - O(log n)的价值。

摘要:

我们考虑将不可分割的物品公平分配给n个代理,每个代理具有加权非负归一化估值,目标是获得高价值保证,即接近每个代理的均等份额。我们证明了所有部分对每个代理都具有高价值的划分在渐近上受到偏差障碍的限制,即Θ(√n)。受此启发,我们的主要目标是克服这一障碍,实现更强的个体保证,这在多项式时间内完成。为此,我们能够展示对偏差障碍的指数性改进。具体来说,我们可以即时创建划分,当代理按顺序到来(代表事先约定的优先顺序)并自主理性地选择部分(即选择价值最高的部分)时,每个代理都能保证获得至少价值为PROP - O(log n)的部分。此外,我们还为三种受限制的估值类别展示了更好的保证,例如那些由共同的物品顺序、对价值的多重性限制以及具有对任何代理影响的限制的超图定义的类别。具体而言,我们研究了以下实例:(1)代理在相对物品估值上“接近”一致同意——这是有序加性设置的推广;(2)估值函数不将相同正价值分配给超过t个物品;(3)估值函数遵循一个超图,这是Christodoulou等人[EC'23]引入的设置,其中代理是顶点,物品是超边。虽然超边和邻域的大小可以是任意的,但任何代理的影响被限制为:定义为那些至少有一个物品估值为正的邻居数量,且该邻居也对至少一个物品估值为正的数目。

英文摘要:

We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that partitions where \emph{every} part yields high value for each agent are asymptotically limited by a discrepancy barrier of $Θ(\sqrt{n})$. Guided by this, our main objective is to overcome this barrier and achieve stronger individual guarantees for each agent in polynomial time. Towards this, we are able to exhibit an exponential improvement over the discrepancy barrier. In particular, we can create partitions on-the-go such that when agents arrive sequentially (representing a previously-agreed priority order) and pick a part autonomously and rationally (i.e., one of highest value), then each is guaranteed a part of value at least $\mathsf{PROP} - \mathcal{O}{(\log n)}$. Moreover, we show even better guarantees for three restricted valuation classes such as those defined by: a common ordering on items, a bound on the multiplicity of values, and a hypergraph with a bound on the \emph{influence} of any agent. Specifically, we study instances where: (1) the agents are ``close'' to unanimity in their relative valuation of the items -- a generalization of the ordered additive setting; (2) the valuation functions do not assign the same positive value to more than $t$ items; and (3) the valuation functions respect a hypergraph, a setting introduced by Christodoulou et al. [EC'23], where agents are vertices and items are hyperedges. While the sizes of the hyperedges and neighborhoods can be arbitrary, the influence of any agent $a$, defined as the number of its neighbors who value at least one item positively that $a$ also values positively, is bounded.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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