逆向选择下垄断保险市场的激励帕累托效率
Incentive Pareto Efficiency in Monopoly Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection
AI总结:
本文研究隐藏信息下的垄断保险市场,证明满足激励相容和个体理性约束的社会福利最大化合同菜单是激励有效的,并在Yaari对偶效用下给出半显式刻画。
摘要:
我们研究一个具有隐藏信息的垄断保险市场,其中代理人的类型$θ$是私人信息,保险公司无法观测,且类型来自连续统。隐藏类型同时影响损失分布和代理人的风险态度。在此框架下,我们证明:如果一份合同菜单在满足激励相容和个体理性约束的条件下最大化社会福利函数,那么它是激励有效的。这一结论对一般效用泛函成立。在Yaari对偶效用的特殊情形下,我们给出了该结果的两个部分逆命题,并给出了社会福利最大化问题最优解的半显式刻画。我们在两种不同设定下进行: (i) 第一种设定假设类型按顺序排列,使得较大的$θ$值对应更风险厌恶的类型,且面临随机更大的损失; (ii) 第二种设定假设较大的$θ$值对应更不风险厌恶的类型,且面临随机更大的损失。在两种设定下,最优合同菜单的结构取决于社会福利权重的大小,我们研究了其若干性质。
英文摘要:
We study a monopolistic insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type $θ$ is private information that is unobservable to the insurer, and it is drawn from a continuum of types. The hidden type affects both the loss distribution and the risk attitude of the agent. Within this framework, we show that a menu of contracts is incentive efficient if it maximizes social welfare function, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. This holds for general utility functionals. In the special case of Yaari Dual Utility, we provide two partial converse statements to this result, and we give a semi-explicit characterization of optimal solutions to the social welfare maximization problem. We do this under two different settings: (i) the first assumes that types are ordered in a way such that larger values of $θ$ correspond to more risk-averse types who face stochastically larger losses; whereas (ii) the second assumes that larger values of $θ$ correspond to less risk-averse types who face stochastically larger losses. In both settings, the structure of optimal menus of contracts depends on the level of the social welfare weight, and we examine several properties thereof.
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