理想情感识别技术的科技社会风险：对情感表达（社会）价值的辩护
Technosocial risks of ideal emotion recognition technologies: A defense of the (social) value of emotional expressions
AI总结：
本文探讨理想情感识别技术可能带来的科技社会风险，指出其对情感表达的社会功能的误解可能导致社会凝聚力和个体自主性的削弱，主张以功能为导向的监管方法保护社会利益。
摘要：
人工智能系统能够实现理想情感识别技术（ERTs）的前景常常基于一个假设，即社会生活会因增加情感透明度而受益。本文通过考察理想ERTs所引发的科技社会风险来挑战这一假设，将理想ERTs理解为能够实时可靠地推断内在情感状态的多模态系统。借助对情感表达和社会实践的哲学论述，以及情感科学和社会心理学的实证研究，我论证了此类系统吸引力的基础是对情感表达社会功能的误解。情感表达不仅作为内心状态的读数，还作为协调行动的工具，促进道德修复，维持人际信任，并支持集体规范。这些功能依赖于部分不透明和认知摩擦的背景。当在具有社会权威或评价性质的场合部署时，理想ERTs会威胁这种表达空间，通过消除认知摩擦，用技术中介的情感特征取代关系意义，并缩小了对理想化和角色敏感表达的空间。结果是一种向情感决定论和环境形式的情感审计的转变，这会削弱社会凝聚力和个体自主性。我论证虽然直观认为增加准确性会正当化此类系统，但在ERTs的情况下，准确性并不直接证明其部署，且在某些情况下可能成为监管克制的理由。我最后通过捍卫一种以功能为导向的监管方法来结束，这种方法将表达自由和意图性情感表达视为某些社会利益的构成要素，并相应地试图保护这些利益免受过度情感可读性的影响。
英文摘要：
The prospect of AI systems that I call ideal emotion recognition technologies (ERTs) is often defended on the assumption that social life would benefit from increased affective transparency. This paper challenges that assumption by examining the technosocial risks posed by ideal ERTs, understood as multimodal systems capable of reliably inferring inner affective states in real time. Drawing on philosophical accounts of emotional expression and social practice, as well as empirical work in affective science and social psychology, I argue that the appeal of such systems rests on a misunderstanding of the social functions of emotional expression. Emotional expressions function not only as read-outs of inner states, but also as tools for coordinating action, enabling moral repair, sustaining interpersonal trust, and supporting collective norms. These functions depend on a background of partial opacity and epistemic friction. When deployed in socially authoritative or evaluative contexts, ideal ERTs threaten this expressive space by collapsing epistemic friction, displacing relational meaning with technology-mediated affective profiles, and narrowing the space for aspirational and role-sensitive expressions. The result is a drift towards affective determinism and ambient forms of affective auditing, which undermine both social cohesion and individual agency. I argue that, although it is intuitive to think that increasing accuracy would legitimise such systems, in the case of ERTs accuracy does not straightforwardly justify their deployment, and may, in some contexts, provide a reason for regulatory restraint. I conclude by defending a function-first regulatory approach that treats expressive discretion and intentional emotional expression as constitutive of certain social goods, and that accordingly seeks to protect these goods from excessive affective legibility.
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