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arXiv 2602.06437physics.soc-phcs.CY
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内容质量和受众选择性之间的共进化注意力经济模型

An attention economy model of co-evolution between content quality and audience selectivity

The University of Tokyo(东京大学);Soka University(创价大学);Rissho University(立教大学);Kansai University(关西大学)

Masaki Chujyo, Isamu Okada, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Dongwoo Lim, Fujio Toriumi

AI总结:

本文提出一个共进化模型,探讨内容质量与受众选择性在有限注意力下的动态平衡,揭示维持健康信息生态的关键条件。

摘要:

在数字环境中,人类注意力已成为一种稀缺且战略上受争议的资源。内容提供者越来越多地陷入过度竞争以获取可见性的局面,通常优先考虑吸引注意力的策略而非实质性的质量。尽管有大量的实证证据,但缺乏能够解释注意力经济基本动态的理论模型。在此,我们开发了一个最小的数学框架,以解释在有限注意力容量下内容质量和受众注意力如何共进化。通过进化博弈的方法,我们建模了提供者和消费者之间的战略反馈:提供者决定投入多少努力进行生产,消费者则选择是否主动搜索高质量内容或被动参与。分析和数值结果揭示了内容动态的三个特征区域:崩溃、边界和共存。这些区域之间的转换取决于受众区分内容质量的有效性。当受众辨别能力较弱时,选择性注意力和高质量生产都会消失,导致信息崩溃。当辨别能力足够且激励机制良好时,高质量和低质量内容通过受众选择性和提供者努力之间的反馈动态共存。这些发现确定了维持健康信息生态系统两个关键条件:受众之间的充分辨别能力和足够的高努力创作激励。该模型为理解机构和平台设计如何防止注意力经济中内容质量退化提供了理论基础。

英文摘要:

Human attention has become a scarce and strategically contested resource in digital environments. Content providers increasingly engage in excessive competition for visibility, often prioritizing attention-grabbing tactics over substantive quality. Despite extensive empirical evidence, however, there is a lack of theoretical models that explain the fundamental dynamics of the attention economy. Here, we develop a minimal mathematical framework to explain how content quality and audience attention coevolve under limited attention capacity. Using an evolutionary game approach, we model strategic feedback between providers, who decide how much effort to invest in production, and consumers, who choose whether to search selectively for high-quality content or to engage passively. Analytical and numerical results reveal three characteristic regimes of content dynamics: collapse, boundary, and coexistence. The transitions between these regimes depend on how effectively audiences can distinguish content quality. When audience discriminability is weak, both selective attention and high-quality production vanish, leading to informational collapse. When discriminability is sufficient and incentives are well aligned, high- and low-quality content dynamically coexist through feedback between audience selectivity and providers' effort. These findings identify two key conditions for sustaining a healthy information ecosystem: adequate discriminability among audiences and sufficient incentives for high-effort creation. The model provides a theoretical foundation for understanding how institutional and platform designs can prevent the degradation of content quality in the attention economy.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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