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arXiv 2602.03129econ.GNq-fin.EC
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公共池资源的数学建模:生物经济学、战略互动与复杂适应系统的一次全面回顾

Mathematical Modeling of Common-Pool Resources: A Comprehensive Review of Bioeconomics, Strategic Interaction, and Complex Adaptive Systems

Keyi College of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University(浙江科技学院科义学院);School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University(浙江科技学院经济与管理学院)

Zebiao Li, Rui Liu, Chengyi Tu

AI总结:

本文综述了公共池资源的数学建模,涵盖生物经济学、战略互动和复杂适应系统,探讨了从经典博弈论到现代动态模型的发展与应用。

摘要:

公共池资源的治理——一种具有高产出减损性和排除难度的资源系统——是经济学、生态学和应用数学领域中最持久且复杂的问题之一。本文全面回顾了为分析、预测和管理这些系统而发展出的数学框架的历史和理论演变。我们追溯了从20世纪中叶的早期确定性生物经济模型到当代复杂的人-环境耦合系统模型的智力轨迹。我们的分析系统地剖析了通过经典合作与非合作博弈理论对“公地悲剧”的形式化,探讨了N人囚徒困境和纳什均衡概念如何提供最初的、尽管悲观的预测基准。随后,我们探讨了“奥斯特罗姆转变”,这要求将制度现实主义——特别是监控、渐进性制裁和沟通——整合到正式博弈论结构中。本文进一步研究了通过进化博弈论和行为经济学放松理性假设,强调前景理论和超几何折扣的破坏性作用。最后,我们综合了随机微分方程和基于代理的计算经济学的最新进展,这些进展捕捉了空间异质性、噪声诱导的制度转变以及崩溃的早期预警信号。通过统一这些多样的数学线索,本文阐明了从静态优化到动态韧性在公共管理中的转变范式。

英文摘要:

The governance of common-pool resources-resource systems characterized by high subtractability of yield and difficulty of exclusion-constitutes one of the most persistent and intricate challenges in the fields of economics, ecology, and applied mathematics. This comprehensive review delineates the historical and theoretical evolution of the mathematical frameworks developed to analyze, predict, and manage these systems. We trace the intellectual trajectory from the early, deterministic bioeconomic models of the mid-20th century, which established the fundamental tension between individual profit maximization and collective efficiency, to the contemporary era of complex coupled human-environment system models. Our analysis systematically dissects the formalization of the "Tragedy of the Commons" through the lens of classical cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, examining how the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium concepts provided the initial, albeit pessimistic, predictive baseline. We subsequently explore the "Ostrom Turn," which necessitated the integration of institutional realism-specifically monitoring, graduated sanctions, and communication-into formal game-theoretic structures. The review further investigates the relaxation of rationality assumptions via evolutionary game theory and behavioral economics, highlighting the destabilizing roles of prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting. Finally, we synthesize recent advances in stochastic differential equations and agent-based computational economics, which capture the critical roles of spatial heterogeneity, noise-induced regime shifts, and early warning signals of collapse. By unifying these diverse mathematical threads, this review elucidates the shifting paradigm from static optimization to dynamic resilience in the management of the commons.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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