arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2602.02667astro-ph.COgr-qchep-thphysics.hist-ph
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在非常大的宇宙中进行概率推断

Probabilistic inference in very large universes

University of Notre Dame(圣母大学);Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院);Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)(伊朗基础科学研究所)

Feraz Azhar, Alan H. Guth, Mohammad Hossein Namjoo

AI总结:

本文提出了一种基于自我定位无差别原理的贝叶斯方法,用于在非常大的宇宙中评估宇宙学理论的合理性。

摘要:

一些宇宙学理论提出,可观测的宇宙只是更大宇宙中的一小部分,在这个更大的宇宙中,描述低能物理定律的参数会随地区而异。如何合理评估一个描述这种大部分不可观测宇宙的理论?我们提出了一种基于理论生成的概率分布的贝叶斯方法来评估我们的观测。我们专注于基本原理,暂不考虑实用性问题。(我们也不考虑度量问题,以讨论其他问题。)我们认为宇宙学理论可以通过标准的贝叶斯更新来检验,但我们需要使用理论预测来确定“第一人”概率——即对我们的观测的概率,考虑所有相关的选择效应。这些选择效应可能依赖于观察者和时间,因此原则上,第一人概率是为每个观察者-瞬间定义的——即一个观察者在某个时间点。第一人概率应考虑观察者对自己和周围环境的信念——即她的“主观状态”。我们倡导“自我定位无差别原理”(PSLI),认为任何真实的观察者都应像从理论上预测的具有相同主观状态的观察者-瞬间中随机选择一样进行预测。我们相信PSLI在直觉上非常合理,但也论证了它最大化了预期正确预测的观察者比例。宇宙学理论通常会预测一组可能的宇宙,每个宇宙都有一定的概率。为了计算第一人概率,我们认为每个可能的宇宙应根据其包含的具有指定主观状态的观察者-瞬间的数量进行加权。我们还讨论了玻尔兹曼大脑、哈特尔和斯雷德尼克的“人类/乔维恩寓言”以及“旧证据”的使用。

英文摘要:

[Abridged] Some cosmological theories propose that the observable universe is a small part of a much larger universe in which parameters describing the low-energy laws of physics vary from region to region. How can we reasonably assess a theory that describes such a mostly unobservable universe? We propose a Bayesian method based on theory-generated probability distributions for our observations. We focus on basic principles, leaving aside concerns about practicality. (We also leave aside the measure problem, to discuss other issues.) We argue that cosmological theories can be tested by standard Bayesian updating, but we need to use theoretical predictions for "first-person" probabilities -- i.e., probabilities for our observations, accounting for all relevant selection effects. These selection effects can depend on the observer, and on time, so in principle first-person probabilities are defined for each observer-instant -- an observer at an instant of time. First-person probabilities should take into account everything the observer believes about herself and her surroundings -- i.e., her "subjective state". We advocate a "Principle of Self-Locating Indifference" (PSLI), asserting that any real observer should make predictions as if she were chosen randomly from the theoretically predicted observer-instants that share her subjective state. We believe the PSLI is intuitively very reasonable, but also argue that it maximizes the expected fraction of observers who will make correct predictions. Cosmological theories will in general predict a set of possible universes, each with a probability. To calculate first-person probabilities, we argue that each possible universe should be weighted by the number of observer-instants in the specified subjective state that it contains. We also discuss Boltzmann brains, the humans/Jovians parable of Hartle and Srednicki, and the use of "old evidence".

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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