有理玩家与从众玩家的游戏
Games with Rational and Herding Players
AI总结:
本文研究了理性玩家与从众玩家混合的大规模群体游戏,提出alpha-RNE概念,探讨从众行为对系统效率的积极影响及潜在风险。
摘要:
经典博弈论是一个强大的框架,用于分析理性玩家之间的战略互动。然而,在许多现实生活中,玩家选择行动是基于其固有的自然倾向,而不是有意识的推理。在本文中,我们开发了一个分析框架,研究具有alpha分数的理性玩家和(1-alpha)分数的从众玩家的大规模群体游戏。我们引入了一个新的均衡概念,称为alpha-理性纳什均衡(简称alpha-RNE),并讨论其解释。一些经典均衡可能会消失,而一些新的均衡可能会出现,但只有在较小的alpha>0时。有趣的是,理性玩家从从众玩家的存在中受益,甚至可能实现超过社会最优的效用。更引人注目的是,在某些情况下,从众玩家也会受益,达到接近社会最优的效用。我们进一步研究从众分数对系统性能的影响,使用诸如价格机制(PoA)等度量标准。在交通网络中,一个著名的悖论最初由猪ou研究,后来由Braess研究,通常源于理性决策:增加一个额外的链接可以减少整体效率。我们的分析得出不同的结论。当相当大的比例的用户表现出从众行为时,引入一个新链接可以提高效率,前提是从众选择可以适当影响。收益在从众分数较高和/或拥堵较低时更大。相反,当从众决策无法影响时,新增的链接可能变得有害。我们还研究了一个带宽共享游戏,在其中从众倾向提高系统效率。最后,我们讨论了在存在从众的情况下机制或影响设计,突显了机会和风险。
英文摘要:
Classical game theory is a powerful framework to analyze the strategic interactions among rational players. However, in many real-life scenarios, players choose actions based on their inherent natural tendencies rather than deliberate reasoning. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework to study large population games with an alpha-fraction of rational and (1-alpha)-fraction of herding players. We introduce a new notion of equilibrium called alpha-Rational Nash Equilibrium (in short, alpha-RNE) and discuss its interpretations. Some classical equilibria may disappear, and some new ones may emerge, but only for smaller alpha >0. Interestingly, rational players benefit from the presence of herding and may even achieve utility exceeding the socially optimum. Even more strikingly, in some cases, the herding players also benefit, attaining utility close to the social optimum. We further study the effect of the herding fraction on system performance using measures such as the Price of Anarchy (PoA). In transportation networks, a well-known paradox first studied by Pigou and later by Braess typically arises from rational decision-making: adding an extra link can reduce overall efficiency. Our analysis leads to a different conclusion. When a substantial fraction of users exhibit herding behavior, introducing a new link can increase efficiency, provided herding choices can be suitably influenced. The gains are larger when the herding fraction is higher and/or congestion is lower. By contrast, when herding decisions cannot be influenced, the added link may become detrimental. We also study a bandwidth sharing game in which herding tendencies improve system efficiency. Finally, we discuss the mechanism or influence design in the presence of herding, highlighting both opportunities and risks.
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