在先进先出港口队列中实现'快速航行，然后等待'：信息共享以实现可持续航运
"Sail Fast, Then Wait" in First-come, First-served Port Queues: Information Sharing for Sustainable Shipping
AI总结：
本文通过信息共享减少航运中的'快速航行，然后等待'现象，促进更环保的港口运营。
摘要：
本研究开发了一种新的排队博弈类，以解释货运航运中常见的实践'快速航行，然后等待'（SFTW），并证明了解决船舶之间信息不对称可以分散港口到达时间。我们将竞争性航行环境建模为不完全信息博弈，其中玩家在异质可行集中战略决定自己的到达时间，遵循先进先出的港口政策。我们的结果表明，在不完全信息设置中，SFTW成为唯一的对称均衡。相反，在完全信息下，均衡集扩大，允许更慢且更环保的行为而不影响服务顺序。我们进一步基于实证数据定量评估信息丰富的影响。我们的发现表明，普及使船舶能够推断他人私人信息的技术可以有效减少SFTW，并使操作更加节能和环保。
英文摘要：
This study develops a novel class of queueing game to explain a common practice in cargo shipping "Sail Fast, Then Wait" (SFTW), and demonstrates that resolving information asymmetry among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times. We formulate a competitive navigating environment as an incomplete information game where players strategically decide their arrival time within heterogeneous feasible sets under First-Come, First-Served port policy. Our results show that in incomplete information settings, SFTW emerges as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Conversely, under complete information, the set of equilibria expands, allowing for slower and more environmentally friendly actions without compromising service order. We further quantitatively evaluate the effect of information enrichment based on empirical data. Our findings suggest that the prevalence of technologies enabling ships to infer others' private information can effectively reduce SFTW and enable more energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable operations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
