睡眠揭示非ces：利用基于睡眠的电源侧信道漏洞破解ECDSA
Sleep Reveals the Nonce: Breaking ECDSA using Sleep-Based Power Side-Channel Vulnerability
AI总结：
本文提出利用基于睡眠的电源侧信道漏洞，通过电源波动提取ECDSA nonce，揭示了睡眠功能在加密系统中的潜在安全风险。
摘要：
椭圆曲线数字签名算法（ECDSA）的安全性依赖于每个签名的nonce的保密性。即使部分nonce泄露，也可以通过基于晶格的密码分析暴露长期私钥。在本文中，我们介绍了一种此前未被探索的电源侧信道漏洞，该漏洞利用睡眠引起的电源尖峰来提取ECDSA的nonce。与传统的基于电源的侧信道攻击不同，这种漏洞利用了由睡眠函数触发的处理器上下文切换期间产生的电源波动。这些波动与标量乘法中依赖nonce的操作相关，即使在常数时间和遮蔽实现中，也能恢复nonce。我们评估了该攻击在多个加密库（RustCrypto、BearSSL和GoCrypto）和处理器架构（包括ARM和RISC-V）上的效果。我们的实验表明，睡眠引起的上下文切换期间电源包络的细微变化为实际的ECDSA nonce提取提供了足够的泄露，恢复了20位的nonce。这些结果将睡眠引起的电源尖峰确立为一种实际的跨平台侧信道威胁，并突显了需要重新考虑加密系统设计选择的必要性。
英文摘要：
Security of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) depends on the secrecy of the per-signature nonce. Even partial nonce leakage can expose the long-term private key through lattice-based cryptanalysis. In this paper, we introduce a previously unexplored power side-channel vulnerability that exploits sleep-induced power spikes to extract ECDSA nonces. Unlike conventional power-based side-channel attacks, this vulnerability leverages power fluctuations generated during processor context switches invoked by sleep functions. These fluctuations correlate with nonce-dependent operations in scalar multiplication, enabling nonce recovery even under constant-time and masked implementations. We evaluate the attack across multiple cryptographic libraries, RustCrypto, BearSSL, and GoCrypto, and processor architectures, including ARM and RISC-V. Our experiments show that subtle variations in the power envelope during sleep-induced context switches provide sufficient leakage for practical ECDSA nonce extraction, recovering 20 bits of the nonce. These results establish sleep-induced power spikes as a practical cross-platform side-channel threat and highlight the need to reconsider design choices in cryptographic systems.
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