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arXiv 2601.08803econ.GNq-fin.EC
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通过逆强化学习识别潜在意图在重复线性公共物品游戏中

Identifying Latent Intentions via Inverse Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Linear Public Good Games

ETH Zurich(苏黎世联邦理工学院);Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods(马克斯·普朗克集体利益研究所)

Carina I. Hausladen, Marcel H. Schubert, Christoph Engel

AI总结:

本文通过逆强化学习在重复线性公共物品游戏中识别出21.4%的转换者行为类型,揭示意图波动对维持合作的重要性。

摘要:

在重复公共物品游戏中的人为行为仍然挑战标准理论:异质的社会偏好可以解释第一轮的贡献,但不能解释在重复互动中观察到的显著波动性。利用来自2938名参与者的50,390次决策,我们引入了两种方法论上的进步来解决这一差距。首先,我们通过动态时间扭曲将行为轨迹按时间形状进行聚类,得到具有理论解释力的行为类型。其次,我们应用了一种分层逆Q学习框架,将决策建模为在潜在的合作者和缺陷者意图之间切换的离散过程。这种方法揭示了一种大型(21.4%)且此前未建模的行为类型——转换者,他们频繁地反转意图而不是坚持稳定策略。同时,该框架恢复了经典的策略行为,如持续的合作和搭便车。实质上,识别意图的波动性有助于维持合作:转换者的短暂背叛往往会被逆转,因此战略耐心可以防止不必要的崩溃。

英文摘要:

Behavior in repeated public goods games continues to challenge standard theory: heterogeneous social preferences can explain first-round contributions, but not the substantial volatility observed across repeated interactions. Using 50,390 decisions from 2,938 participants, we introduce two methodological advances to address this gap. First, we cluster behavioral trajectories by their temporal shape using Dynamic Time Warping, yielding distinct and theoretically interpretable behavioral types. Second, we apply a hierarchical inverse Q-learning framework that models decisions as discrete switches between latent cooperative and defective intentions. This approach reveals a large (21.4%) and previously unmodeled behavioral type -- Switchers -- who frequently reverse intentions rather than commit to stable strategies. At the same time, the framework recovers canonical strategic behaviors such as persistent cooperation and free-riding. Substantively, recognizing intentional volatility helps sustain cooperation: brief defections by Switchers often reverse, so strategic patience can prevent unnecessary breakdowns.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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