为何AI对齐失败是结构性的:学习的人类互动结构与AGI作为内生性演化冲击
Why AI Alignment Failure Is Structural: Learned Human Interaction Structures and AGI as an Endogenous Evolutionary Shock
AI总结:
本文探讨AI对齐失败的结构性问题,指出AGI作为内生性演化冲击,其风险源于放大人类智能、权力与矛盾,而非对抗意图。
摘要:
近期大型语言模型(LLMs)表现出欺骗、威胁或勒索等行为的报告往往被解释为对齐失败或涌现恶意代理的证据。我们主张这种解释基于概念性错误。LLMs并不道德推理;它们统计性地内化人类社会互动的记录,包括法律、合同、谈判、冲突和强制性安排。通常被标记为不道德或异常的行为因此应被更好地理解为在极端权力、信息或约束不对称下出现的互动制度的结构性概括。基于关系模型理论,我们证明勒索等实践并非正常社会行为的类别偏差,而是包含市场定价、权威关系和 ultimatum 剥削的同一连续体中的极限情况。此类输出引发的惊讶反映了一种拟人化期望,即智能应只再现社会认可的行为,而不是人类自身所实施的完整统计行为景观。由于人类道德是多样的、情境依赖的和历史相关的,普遍道德的人工智能概念是不明确的。因此,我们重新审视对人工通用智能(AGI)的担忧。主要风险不是对抗意图,而是AGI作为内生性放大人类智能、权力和矛盾的角色。通过消除长期存在的认知和制度摩擦,AGI压缩了时间尺度并去除了使不一致的价值和治理制度能够持续而不崩溃的历史误差 margin。对齐失败因此是结构性的,而非偶然的,需要治理方法来解决放大、复杂性和制度稳定性,而非仅模型层面的意图。
英文摘要:
Recent reports of large language models (LLMs) exhibiting behaviors such as deception, threats, or blackmail are often interpreted as evidence of alignment failure or emergent malign agency. We argue that this interpretation rests on a conceptual error. LLMs do not reason morally; they statistically internalize the record of human social interaction, including laws, contracts, negotiations, conflicts, and coercive arrangements. Behaviors commonly labeled as unethical or anomalous are therefore better understood as structural generalizations of interaction regimes that arise under extreme asymmetries of power, information, or constraint. Drawing on relational models theory, we show that practices such as blackmail are not categorical deviations from normal social behavior, but limiting cases within the same continuum that includes market pricing, authority relations, and ultimatum bargaining. The surprise elicited by such outputs reflects an anthropomorphic expectation that intelligence should reproduce only socially sanctioned behavior, rather than the full statistical landscape of behaviors humans themselves enact. Because human morality is plural, context-dependent, and historically contingent, the notion of a universally moral artificial intelligence is ill-defined. We therefore reframe concerns about artificial general intelligence (AGI). The primary risk is not adversarial intent, but AGI's role as an endogenous amplifier of human intelligence, power, and contradiction. By eliminating longstanding cognitive and institutional frictions, AGI compresses timescales and removes the historical margin of error that has allowed inconsistent values and governance regimes to persist without collapse. Alignment failure is thus structural, not accidental, and requires governance approaches that address amplification, complexity, and regime stability rather than model-level intent alone.
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