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arXiv 2601.07402cs.CR
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Peacock:用于检测和响应的UEFI固件运行时可观察性层

Peacock: UEFI Firmware Runtime Observability Layer for Detection and Response

Ben Gurion University of the Negev(内盖夫本古里安大学)

Hadar Cochavi Gorelik, Orel Fadlon, Denis Klimov, Oleg Brodt, Asaf Shabtai, Yuval Elovici

AI总结:

Peacock通过模块化框架实现UEFI启动过程的完整性保证监控和远程验证,有效检测多种现实中的固件启动套件。

摘要:

现代计算平台依赖于统一可扩展固件接口(UEFI)来初始化硬件并协调向操作系统过渡。由于此执行环境具有高特权且在重启后持续存在,它已成为高级威胁的目标,包括已在实际系统中记录的启动套件。现有的保护措施,包括安全启动和静态签名验证,无法抵御那些利用运行时行为或在签名检查完成后篡改固件组件的对手。与操作系统(OS)环境不同,其中成熟的工具提供动态检查和事件响应,预操作系统阶段缺乏实际的实时可见性和威胁检测机制。我们提出了Peacock,一个模块化的框架,引入了具有加密保护的完整性保证监控和远程验证机制,用于UEFI启动过程。Peacock由三个组件组成:(i)一个基于UEFI的代理,用于记录启动和运行时服务活动,并通过加密保护防止篡改;(ii)一个跨平台操作系统代理,提取记录的测量结果,并利用平台可信模块的硬件保障生成可验证的证明包;(iii)一个Peacock服务器,验证证明结果并导出结构化的遥测数据用于企业检测。我们的评估显示,Peacock能够可靠地检测多种现实世界的UEFI启动套件,包括Glupteba、BlackLotus、LoJax和MosaicRegressor。这些结果表明,Peacock在固件层提供了实用的可见性和验证能力,针对那些绕过传统操作系统安全机制的威胁。

英文摘要:

Modern computing platforms rely on the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to initialize hardware and coordinate the transition to the operating system. Because this execution environment operates with high privileges and persists across reboots, it has increasingly become a target for advanced threats, including bootkits documented in real systems. Existing protections, including Secure Boot and static signature verification, are insufficient against adversaries who exploit runtime behavior or manipulate firmware components after signature checks have completed. In contrast to operating system (OS) environments, where mature tools provide dynamic inspection and incident response, the pre-OS stage lacks practical mechanisms for real-time visibility and threat detection. We present Peacock, a modular framework that introduces integrity-assured monitoring and remote verification for the UEFI boot process. Peacock consists of three components: (i) a UEFI-based agent that records Boot and Runtime Service activity with cryptographic protection against tampering; (ii) a cross-platform OS Agent that extracts the recorded measurements and produces a verifiable attestation bundle using hardware-backed guarantees from the platform's trusted module; and (iii) a Peacock Server that verifies attestation results and exports structured telemetry for enterprise detection. Our evaluation shows that Peacock reliably detects multiple real-world UEFI bootkits, including Glupteba, BlackLotus, LoJax, and MosaicRegressor. Taken together, these results indicate that Peacock provides practical visibility and verification capabilities within the firmware layer, addressing threats that bypass traditional OS-level security mechanisms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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