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arXiv 2601.05965econ.THcs.GTmath.CO
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多动作博弈中的博弈连通性与自适应动力学

Game connectivity and adaptive dynamics in many-action games

University of Bristol(布里斯托大学);Heilbronn Institute for Mathematical Research(海尔布隆数学研究所);University of Oxford(牛津大学)

Tom Johnston, Michael Savery, Alex Scott, Bassel Tarbush

AI总结:

研究多动作博弈中连通性的典型结构,发现当动作数k很大时,连通博弈的比例趋于1-ζ_n,其中ζ_n>0为显式常数,且对于n≥3,ζ_n很小并随n迅速趋于0。

摘要:

我们根据博弈的连通性性质研究其典型结构。如果一个博弈存在纯纳什均衡,并且从每个非纯纳什均衡的动作组合到每个纯纳什均衡都存在一条最优反应路径,则该博弈是“连通的”;如果一个博弈没有无差异情况,则它是“一般的”。在之前的工作中,我们证明了在所有存在纯纳什均衡的$n$玩家$k$动作一般博弈中,当$n$相对于$k$足够大时,连通博弈的比例趋于$1$。这里,我们考虑$k$很大的情况,其行为不同:我们证明当$k$很大时,连通比例趋于$1-ζ_n$,其中$ζ_n>0$是一个显式常数。因此,恒定比例的多动作博弈是\emph{不}连通的。然而,对于$n\geq3$,$ζ_n$很小且随$n$迅速趋于$0$,因此随着$n$增加,除了极小一部分外,几乎所有多玩家多动作博弈都是连通的。由于连通性有利于均衡收敛,我们找到一个简单的自适应动力学,它保证在几乎所有存在纯纳什均衡的一般博弈中收敛到纯纳什均衡。我们依靠新的概率和组合论证来处理$k$很大的情况。

英文摘要:

We study the typical structure of games in terms of their connectivity properties. A game is `connected' if it has a pure Nash equilibrium and there is a best-response path from every action profile which is not a pure Nash equilibrium to every pure Nash equilibrium; a game is generic if it has no indifferences. In previous work we showed that, among all $n$-player $k$-action generic games that admit a pure Nash equilibrium, the fraction that are connected tends to $1$ as $n$ gets sufficiently large relative to $k$. Here, we consider the large-$k$ regime, which behaves differently: we show that the connected fraction tends to $1-ζ_n$ as $k$ gets large, where $ζ_n>0$ is an explicit constant. Thus, a constant fraction of many-action games are \emph{not} connected. However, for $n\geq3$, $ζ_n$ is small and tends to $0$ rapidly with $n$, so as $n$ increases all but a vanishingly small fraction of many-player-many-action games are connected. Since connectedness is conducive to equilibrium convergence, we find a simple adaptive dynamic that is guaranteed to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium in all but a vanishingly small fraction of generic games that have one. We rely on new probabilistic and combinatorial arguments to tackle the large-$k$ regime.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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