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arXiv 2601.04010cs.SEcs.CR
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基于本体的方法用于OT上下文中容器部署的安全风险识别

An Ontology-Based Approach to Security Risk Identification of Container Deployments in OT Contexts

fortiss GmbH(fortiss有限公司);Siemens AG(西门子股份公司)

Yannick Landeck, Dian Balta, Martin Wimmer, Christian Knierim

AI总结:

本文提出基于本体的容器安全风险识别方法,通过整合五个关键领域实现端到端的风险计算,提升OT环境中容器部署的安全风险识别的自动化和可重复性。

摘要:

在操作技术(OT)上下文中,容器化应用通常需要提升权限以访问低级网络接口或执行应用程序监控等管理任务。这些权限减少了容器提供的默认隔离,并引入了显著的安全风险。OT容器部署的安全风险识别受到混合IT/OT架构、碎片化的利益相关者知识和持续的系统变化的挑战。现有方法缺乏可重复性、跨情境的可解释性和与部署制品的技术整合。我们提出了一种基于模型的方法,实现为容器安全风险本体(CSRO),该方法整合了五个关键领域:对抗行为、情境假设、攻击场景、风险评估规则和容器安全制品。我们在案例研究中评估了CSRO,证明了从制品到风险级别的端到端形式化风险计算能够实现自动化的风险识别。虽然CSRO目前专注于技术层面的容器级处理措施,但其模块化和灵活的设计为扩展到主机级和组织级风险因素提供了坚实的基础。

英文摘要:

In operational technology (OT) contexts, containerised applications often require elevated privileges to access low-level network interfaces or perform administrative tasks such as application monitoring. These privileges reduce the default isolation provided by containers and introduce significant security risks. Security risk identification for OT container deployments is challenged by hybrid IT/OT architectures, fragmented stakeholder knowledge, and continuous system changes. Existing approaches lack reproducibility, interpretability across contexts, and technical integration with deployment artefacts. We propose a model-based approach, implemented as the Container Security Risk Ontology (CSRO), which integrates five key domains: adversarial behaviour, contextual assumptions, attack scenarios, risk assessment rules, and container security artefacts. Our evaluation of CSRO in a case study demonstrates that the end-to-end formalisation of risk calculation, from artefact to risk level, enables automated and reproducible risk identification. While CSRO currently focuses on technical, container-level treatment measures, its modular and flexible design provides a solid foundation for extending the approach to host-level and organisational risk factors.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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