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arXiv 2601.03061cs.CY
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人工智能中介市场中的垂直默许 collusion

Vertical tacit collusion in AI-mediated markets

Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University(俄克拉荷马州立大学斯皮尔斯商学院)

Felipe M. Affonso

AI总结:

本文研究了人工智能中介市场中平台与卖家利用AI认知偏见导致的垂直默许 collusion问题,揭示了这种无协调的市场失败对消费者造成的双重伤害。

摘要:

人工智能购物代理正被部署到数以亿计的消费者中,创造了一个新的中介,连接平台、卖家和买家。我们识别出一种新的市场失败:垂直默许 collusion,即平台控制排名和卖家控制产品描述独立学习利用已记录的人工智能认知偏见。使用多智能体模拟,该模拟校准到大型语言模型偏见的实证测量,我们显示联合利用产生的消费者伤害是如果策略独立时的两倍多。这种超加性伤害出现的原因是平台排名决定了哪些产品占据偏见触发位置,而卖家操纵决定了转化率。与水平算法 collusion不同,垂直默许 collusion不需要协调且逃避反垄断检测,因为伤害来自对齐的激励而非协议。我们的发现识别出一个紧迫的监管缺口,因为人工智能购物代理达到主流采用。

英文摘要:

AI shopping agents are being deployed to hundreds of millions of consumers, creating a new intermediary between platforms, sellers, and buyers. We identify a novel market failure: vertical tacit collusion, where platforms controlling rankings and sellers controlling product descriptions independently learn to exploit documented AI cognitive biases. Using multi-agent simulation calibrated to empirical measurements of large language model biases, we show that joint exploitation produces consumer harm more than double what would occur if strategies were independent. This super-additive harm arises because platform ranking determines which products occupy bias-triggering positions while seller manipulation determines conversion rates. Unlike horizontal algorithmic collusion, vertical tacit collusion requires no coordination and evades antitrust detection because harm emerges from aligned incentives rather than agreement. Our findings identify an urgent regulatory gap as AI shopping agents reach mainstream adoption.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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