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arXiv 2601.01334econ.TH
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风险下保留判断的协议

Agreement with reservation of judgment under risk

Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University(早稻田大学经济学研究科);Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University(一桥大学经济学研究科)

Leo Kurata, Kensei Nakamura

AI总结:

本文提出在风险下保留判断的帕累托原则,通过加权求和构建社会效用函数,确保自然属性的聚合规则。

摘要:

本文研究了在风险下偏好聚合的问题。在我们的模型中,每个代理人有一个不完全的偏好关系,用一组期望效用函数来表示。经典的帕累托原则对涉及不确定性的协议保持沉默。为了考察尊重此类协议的含义,我们引入了当某些人保留判断时可以应用的帕累托原则。我们的主要结果表明,在此原则下,对于每个个体的效用函数组合,存在一个对应的社会效用函数,其构造为个体效用函数的加权和。这些聚合规则保证了标准帕累托原则无法保证的自然属性。

英文摘要:

This paper studies preference aggregation under risk. In our model, each agent has an incomplete preference relation represented by a set of expected utility functions. The classical Pareto principle is silent on agreement involving indecisiveness. To examine the implications of respecting such agreement, we introduce the Paretian principle that can be applied when some individuals reserve their judgment. Our main result shows that, under this principle, for each combination of individuals' utility functions, there exists a corresponding social utility function constructed as a weighted sum of the individual ones. These aggregation rules guarantee natural properties that the standard Pareto principle fails to ensure.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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