在随机性和战略不确定性下的新闻供应商决策:理论与实验证据
Newsvendor Decisions under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainties: Theory and Experimental Evidence
AI总结:
研究探讨了在随机性和战略不确定性下零售商的定价与库存决策,发现价格竞争不足且存在拉向中心偏差,强调了行为倾向在零售运营中的重要性。
摘要:
数字商业平台的快速扩张放大了竞争零售商之间协调定价和库存管理决策的战略重要性。受领先电商平台实践的启发,我们分析了一个顺序双寡头新闻供应商博弈,其中零售商首先公开设定价格,随后在需求不确定性下做出私人库存决策。我们的理论预测,更高的利润边际和需求不确定性会加剧价格竞争,而最优库存响应则由利润边际塑造。然而,实验证据表明,参与者通常不愿意在价格上竞争,经常协调在显著焦点(保留)价格上,尤其是在低利润边际设置中,并且在定价上对需求不确定性表现出不敏感性。在库存方面,参与者订单量对所选价格的敏感性较低,并且继续表现出已记录的“拉向中心”偏差。这些发现揭示了在竞争下定价和库存决策之间的脱节,并突显了在零售运营中考虑持续行为倾向的重要性。
英文摘要:
The rapid expansion of digital commerce platforms has amplified the strategic importance of coordinated pricing and inventory management decisions among competing retailers. Motivated by practices on leading e-commerce platforms, we analyze a sequential duopolistic newsvendor game where retailers first publicly set prices and subsequently make private inventory decisions under demand uncertainty. Our theory predicts that higher profit margins and demand uncertainty intensify price competition, while optimal inventory responses to demand uncertainty are shaped by profit margins. Laboratory evidence, however, reveals that participants are generally reluctant to compete on price, frequently coordinating on salient focal (reserve) prices, particularly in low-margin settings, and show little sensitivity to demand uncertainty in pricing. On the inventory side, participants' order quantities are largely insensitive to chosen prices and continue to exhibit well-documented Pull-to-Center biases. These findings reveal a disconnect between pricing and inventory decisions under competition and highlight the importance of accounting for persistent behavioral tendencies in retail operations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。