具有可信度测度的共同 p 信念:扩展摘要
Common $p$-Belief with Plausibility Measures: Extended Abstract
AI总结:
本文将 Monderer-Samet-Neeman 同意定理从经典概率测度扩展到可信度测度,并应用于非经典信念模型。
摘要:
Aumann 著名的同意分歧定理指出,如果一组智能体共享一个共同的先验,通过贝叶斯条件更新他们的信念基于私人信息,并且对某些事件的后验信念有共同知识,这些后验必须相同。Monderer 和 Samet 提供了这个定理的一个优雅推广,后来由 Neeman 进一步完善:如果一组智能体共享一个共同的先验,通过贝叶斯条件更新他们的信念基于私人信息,并且对后验有共同 p 信念,这些后验必须接近(即它们之间的差异不能超过 1 - p)。这里,共同 p 信念将共同知识的概念扩展到概率信念:如果每个智能体都至少以 p 度相信事件 E,则他们共同 p 信念事件 E。我们进一步将 Monderer-Samet-Neeman 同意定理从经典概率测度扩展到可信度测度——由 Halpern 引入的一个非常一般的框架,它统一了许多信念的正式模型。为了便于这个扩展,我们提供了 Monderer-Samet-Neeman 定理在经典设置中的新证明。在原始证明和我们新证明的基础上,我们提供了两个不同的定理对基于可信度的结构的推广。然后,我们将这些推广的结果应用于几种非经典信念模型,包括条件概率结构和字典序概率结构。此外,我们还表明,当我们的推广定理不适用时,Monderer-Samet-Neeman 同意定理会失效。这些发现表明,我们的结果成功地识别了信念模型满足 Monderer-Samet-Neeman 同意定理所需的最小条件。
英文摘要:
Aumann's famous Agreeing to Disagree Theorem states that if a group of agents share a common prior, update their beliefs by Bayesian conditioning based on private information, and have common knowledge of their posterior beliefs regarding some event, these posteriors must be identical. There is an elegant generalization of this theorem by Monderer and Samet, later refined by Neeman: if a group of agents share a common prior, update their beliefs using Bayesian conditioning on private information, and have common p-belief of their posteriors, these posteriors must be close (i.e., they cannot differ by more than 1 - p). Here, common p-belief generalizes the concept of common knowledge to probabilistic beliefs: agents commonly p-believe an event E if everyone believes E to at least degree p, everyone believes to at least degree p that everyone believes E to at least degree p, and so on. This paper further extends the Monderer-Samet-Neeman Agreement Theorem from classical probability measures to plausibility measures -- a very general framework introduced by Halpern that unifies many formal models of belief. To facilitate this extension, we provide a new proof of the Monderer-Samet-Neeman theorem in the classical setting. Building upon both the original proof and our new proof, we offer two different generalizations of the theorem to plausibility-based structures. We then apply these generalized results to several non-classical belief models, including conditional probability structures and lexicographic probability structures. Moreover, we show that whenever our generalized theorems do not apply, the Monderer-Samet-Neeman Agreement Theorem fails. These findings suggest that our results successfully identify the minimal conditions required for a belief model to satisfy the Monderer-Samet-Neeman Agreement Theorem.
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