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arXiv 2511.02675econ.TH
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不对称信息下的自动化与任务分配

Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校)

Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey

AI总结:

本文研究信息不对称下企业如何在工人与机器间分配任务,发现信息摩擦较小时任务为替代关系,摩擦较大时可能转为互补关系,且该结论在多企业竞争环境下依然成立。

摘要:

企业可以使用机器或工人来完成生产产出所需的任务。与机器不同,工人拥有关于其任务偏好的私人信息。我研究了这种信息不对称如何塑造企业用于在工人和机器之间分配任务的机制。我识别了当信息摩擦较大与较小时所使用机制之间的重要定性差异。当信息摩擦较小时,任务是替代品:自动化一项任务会降低其他任务的边际成本,并减少工人产生的剩余。当摩擦较大时,任务可能成为互补品:自动化可能提高其他任务的边际成本,并增加工人产生的剩余。结果扩展到了多个企业竞争工人的环境。

英文摘要:

A firm can complete the tasks needed to produce output using either machines or workers. Unlike machines, workers have private information about their preferences over tasks. I study how this information asymmetry shapes the mechanism used by the firm to allocate tasks across workers and machines. I identify important qualitative differences between the mechanisms used when information frictions are large versus small. When information frictions are small, tasks are substitutes: automating one task lowers the marginal cost of other tasks and reduces the surplus generated by workers. When frictions are large, tasks can become complements: automation can raise the marginal cost of other tasks and increase the surplus generated by workers. The results extend to a setting with multiple firms competing for workers.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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