动态相关性作为激励工具
Mediated Trust
AI总结:
本文研究动态相关性如何作为激励机制解决道德风险问题,通过企业中介工人与短期客户互动,揭示非平稳信息结构对激励约束的影响,并探讨工人耐心程度对帕累托改进的影响。
摘要:
我将动态相关性引入作为激励工具以应对道德风险。一家公司介导长期工人与短期客户之间的互动。我证明最优中介导致一种非平稳的相关信息结构,从私人通信过渡到公开通信,符合组织中从个性化到标准化通信的实证转变。通过使用私人通信来关联延续,公司放松了原本约束性的激励约束,并加强了努力激励。中介扩展了帕累托前沿,并在工人与平均客户之间产生分配冲突,并且只有当工人足够耐心时,中介才是帕累托改进。
英文摘要:
I study how mediation facilitates trade between a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers. Without mediation, the seller's moral hazard bounds equilibrium payoffs away from his favorable part, and possibly all, of the efficiency frontier of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs for the seller and the average buyer, even as he becomes arbitrarily patient. In contrast, with mediation, all interior payoffs in this set can be attained in equilibrium as the seller becomes patient. Mediation achieves these gains by privately informing the seller which continuation applies. Realizing these gains in full requires nonrecursive mediation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。