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arXiv 2510.26091econ.TH
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TEE-BFT:为数据中心执行保障的安全性定价

TEE-BFT: Pricing the Security of Data Center Execution Assurance

Subzero Labs

Alex Shamis, Matt Stephenson, Linfeng Zhou

AI总结:

本文针对区块链BFT通信限制,提出基于TEE的数据中心执行保障共谋成本委托代理模型,推导出闭式威慑阈值与保守设计界限,证明合理参数可保护约万亿美元价值。

摘要:

区块链在自身生态系统之外通信时面临固有限制,这在很大程度上归因于拜占庭容错(BFT)的3f+1安全模型。可信执行环境(TEEs)是一种极具前景的缓解方案,因为它们允许单一可信代理与外部系统进行安全交互。本文为数据中心执行保障设计中的TEE妥协问题,开发了一个共谋成本委托代理模型。该模型分离了攻击盈利能力的主要驱动因素:K-of-n协调阈值、独立检测风险q、异构的成员个人制裁F_i,以及与所保障价值(β乘以V)成正比的短窗口流量奖励(ω)。我们推导出了闭式威慑阈值和保守的设计界限(V_safe),使得在透明的参数选择下,共谋变得无利可图。基于时间优势套利的校准表明,合理的TEE参数能够保护约一万亿美元的价值。

英文摘要:

Blockchains face inherent limitations when communicating outside their own ecosystem, largely due to the Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) 3f+1 security model. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a promising mitigation because they allow a single trusted broker to interface securely with external systems. This paper develops a cost-of-collusion principal-agent model for compromising a TEE in a Data Center Execution Assurance design. The model isolates the main drivers of attack profitability: a K-of-n coordination threshold, independent detection risk q, heterogeneous per-member sanctions F_i, and a short-window flow prize (omega) proportional to the value secured (beta times V). We derive closed-form deterrence thresholds and a conservative design bound (V_safe) that make collusion unprofitable under transparent parameter choices. Calibrations based on time-advantaged arbitrage indicate that plausible TEE parameters can protect on the order of one trillion dollars in value.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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