ADMIT: RAG基事实核查中的少样本知识污染攻击
ADMIT: Few-shot Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on RAG-based Fact Checking
AI总结：
ADMIT提出一种无需访问目标模型的少样本攻击方法，通过注入真实证据来翻转事实核查决策，实验显示其在多种系统中成功率达86%，揭示了RAG事实核查系统的重大漏洞。
摘要：
ADMIT提出了一种无需访问目标模型的少样本攻击方法，通过注入真实证据来翻转事实核查决策，实验显示其在多种系统中成功率达86%，揭示了RAG事实核查系统的重大漏洞。
英文摘要：
Knowledge poisoning poses a critical threat to Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems by injecting adversarial content into knowledge bases, tricking Large Language Models (LLMs) into producing attacker-controlled outputs grounded in manipulated context. Prior work highlights LLMs' susceptibility to misleading or malicious retrieved content. However, real-world fact-checking scenarios are more challenging, as credible evidence typically dominates the retrieval pool. To investigate this problem, we extend knowledge poisoning to the fact-checking setting, where retrieved context includes authentic supporting or refuting evidence. We propose \textbf{ADMIT} (\textbf{AD}versarial \textbf{M}ulti-\textbf{I}njection \textbf{T}echnique), a few-shot, semantically aligned poisoning attack that flips fact-checking decisions and induces deceptive justifications, all without access to the target LLMs, retrievers, or token-level control. Extensive experiments show that ADMIT transfers effectively across 4 retrievers, 11 LLMs, and 4 cross-domain benchmarks, achieving an average attack success rate (ASR) of 86\% at an extremely low poisoning rate of $0.93 \times 10^{-6}$, and remaining robust even in the presence of strong counter-evidence. Compared with prior state-of-the-art attacks, ADMIT improves ASR by 11.2\% across all settings, exposing significant vulnerabilities in real-world RAG-based fact-checking systems.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
