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arXiv 2509.18366cs.CR
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将道听途说变为发现:工业3D打印机侧信道信息转化为窃取对象设计

Turning Hearsay into Discovery: Industrial 3D Printer Side Channel Information Translated to Stealing the Object Design

Auburn University(奥本大学);Google LLC(谷歌有限责任公司);Columbia University(哥伦比亚大学)

Aleksandr Dolgavin, Jacob Gatlin, Moti Yung, Mark Yampolskiy

AI总结:

本文首次证明侧信道攻击可严重威胁工业级3D打印机,通过采集粉末床熔融工艺的功率侧信道数据并结合差分功率分析启发的方法,能够高精度重建打印模型,表明工业环境中设计安全还需防止物理信号泄漏。

摘要:

外包3D打印(即增材制造,AM)这一有望主导制造业的行业,其核心安全问题是保护与制造商共享的数字设计(其中包含设计师的模型,即其知识产权)。在此,我们首次证明,侧信道攻击实际上是对现有工业级3D打印机的具体严重威胁,能够重建所打印的模型(无论是否采用直接隐藏设计的手段,例如在传输中和加载到打印机之前对其进行加密)。此前,此类攻击仅在相当简单的FDM桌面3D打印机上得到演示,而这些打印机在贵重设计的制造中作用微不足道。我们聚焦于粉末床熔融(PBF)增材制造工艺,该工艺在利用聚合物和金属制造近净成形零件方面很受欢迎。我们演示了如何对其各个执行器进行仪表化,以在打印过程中采集功率侧信道信息。然后,我们提出了仅根据采集到的功率侧信道数据重建3D打印模型的方法。此外,受差分功率分析启发,我们开发了一种基于多条轨迹提高重建质量的方法。我们在两个复杂程度不同的设计模型上测试了该方法。对于不同模型,通过重建设计与原始设计之间基于体素的体积比较,我们实现了高达90.29%的真阳性率,以及低至7.02%和9.71%的假阳性率和假阴性率。我们从这次攻击中得到的教训是,在工业环境中,设计文件的安全不能仅仅依赖于保护文件本身,还必须依赖于确保不会有功率、噪声和类似信号泄漏给打印机附近的潜在窃听者。

英文摘要:

The central security issue of outsourced 3D printing (aka AM: Additive Manufacturing), an industry that is expected to dominate manufacturing, is the protection of the digital design (containing the designers' model, which is their intellectual property) shared with the manufacturer. Here, we show, for the first time, that side-channel attacks are, in fact, a concrete serious threat to existing industrial grade 3D printers, enabling the reconstruction of the model printed (regardless of employing ways to directly conceal the design, e.g. by encrypting it in transit and before loading it into the printer). Previously, such attacks were demonstrated only on fairly simple FDM desktop 3D printers, which play a negligible role in manufacturing of valuable designs. We focus on the Powder Bed Fusion (PBF) AM process, which is popular for manufacturing net-shaped parts with both polymers and metals. We demonstrate how its individual actuators can be instrumented for the collection of power side-channel information during the printing process. We then present our approach to reconstruct the 3D printed model solely from the collected power side-channel data. Further, inspired by Differential Power Analysis, we developed a method to improve the quality of the reconstruction based on multiple traces. We tested our approach on two design models with different degrees of complexity. For different models, we achieved as high as 90.29~\% of True Positives and as low as 7.02~\% and 9.71~\% of False Positives and False Negatives by voxel-based volumetric comparison between reconstructed and original designs. The lesson learned from our attack is that the security of design files cannot solely rely on protecting the files themselves in an industrial environment, but must instead also rely on assuring no leakage of power, noise and similar signals to potential eavesdroppers in the printer's vicinity.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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