政府声誉与财政能力
Reputation and Delegated Public Spending
AI总结:
本文研究财政当局与行政长官间的信息不对称问题,构建静态与动态模型分析声誉对财政资源分配的影响,验证无限期模型的平稳均衡,为政府财政决策提供理论依据。
摘要:
国家如何将财政资源分配给一位其实施公共支出的意愿是私人信息的行政长官?我们将选择扭曲性税收资助指令的不知情财政当局,与要么提供公共物品要么挪用收益的行政长官区分开来。因此,声誉不仅决定了预期的实施情况,还决定了授权范围。在静态基准模型中,收入仅在声誉临界值以上筹集。在动态模型中,指令还会对行政长官进行考验:提供公共物品会牺牲当前租金,但能保留未来的财政获取机会。我们证明,动态激活临界值不大于静态临界值的平方;在线性收益、二次成本的经济体中,该界限是精确的,且与贴现率无关。因此,当每一笔正税收在静态下都不可取时,正的试验性指令可能是最优的。随后,我们计算并验证了一个无限期模型的平稳均衡,该模型包含噪声信号、内生审计和支出需求冲击。这些均衡具有一个不活跃的声誉区域,其中授权和学习同时停止、依赖历史的有限财政能力,以及状态依存的指令和审计。支出需求冲击会保持预期声誉不变,但会改变声誉风险和转化为公共物品的收入规模。
英文摘要:
This paper studies a repeated funding relationship between a grant administrator and an implementing agency. The agency is either committed to implementation or able to divert the advance. The administrator chooses whether to fund and whether to verify, but cannot commit to future decisions. We construct a stationary equilibrium in which agencies with intermediate reputations are audited. An inspection either reveals diversion and ends funding or leads to continued funding with intermittent auditing. In the latter case, audits sustain implementation without further revealing type, while a strategic agency diverts unaudited advances. Cheaper auditing makes funding worthwhile at lower reputations. For initial beliefs audited under both cost levels, it raises the administrator's value but reduces expected long-run implemented spending: a higher reputation is required to retain funding, and fewer strategic agencies meet that requirement. For beliefs audited under both programs, better detection at unchanged cost instead raises implementation without changing the probability of continued funding. These results show why project delivery alone need not measure the value of improved monitoring.
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