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arXiv 2509.03085econ.TH
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不完全信任下的最优税收

Optimal Taxation under Imperfect Trust

Emin Ablyatifov, Georgy Lukyanov

AI总结:

该研究在拉姆齐框架中引入公民对政府的信任因素,发现信任阈值决定最优税收政策,低信任时最优为零税收,高信任时按信任调整公共资金边际价值确定税率,为低信任环境的税收设计提供思路。

摘要:

我们研究当公民不完全相信政府会将税收转化为有用的公共品时的最优税收问题。在一个标准的拉姆齐框架中,代表性主体重视由扭曲性税收融资的公共品,但认为政府仅以给定概率是诚实的,否则可能挪用全部税收收入。这一与经典模型的简单偏离得出两个核心结果:第一,存在一个明确的信任阈值:若感知到的政府诚实度过低,任何正税率都会降低预期福利,最优政策为零税收的角点解,即便公共品具有价值;第二,一旦信任超过该阈值,最优税收的常规充分统计量逻辑会重新出现,但存在经信任调整的公共资金边际价值,该价值会降低征税的收益。在一个简单的参数示例中,我们得到了将信任映射到最优税率和公共部门规模的闭式表达式。该框架为将政府可信度纳入税收设计提供了一种简洁方式,并表明在低信任环境中,应先进行提升可信度的改革,再尝试扩大税基。

英文摘要:

We study optimal taxation when citizens are not fully confident that the government will transform tax revenue into useful public goods. In an otherwise standard Ramsey framework, a representative agent values a public good financed by distortionary taxes, but believes that the government is honest only with some given probability and may otherwise divert all revenue. This simple departure from the canonical model delivers two central results. First, there is a sharp trust threshold: if perceived government honesty is too low, any positive tax rate lowers expected welfare and the optimal policy is a zero-tax corner, even though the public good is valued. Second, once trust exceeds this threshold, the usual sufficient-statistics logic of optimal taxation re-emerges, but with a trust-adjusted marginal value of public funds that scales down the benefits of raising revenue. In a simple parametric example we obtain closed-form expressions that map trust into the optimal tax rate and the size of the public sector. The framework provides a compact way to incorporate government credibility into tax design and suggests that in low-trust environments credibility-enhancing reforms should precede attempts to expand the tax base.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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