反击 Cobalt:利用网络流量元数据检测伪装的 Cobalt Strike 命令与控制信道
Striking Back At Cobalt: Using Network Traffic Metadata To Detect Cobalt Strike Masquerading Command and Control Channels
AI总结:
针对伪装并加密的 Cobalt Strike C2 流量检测难题,本文提出仅用标准网络流量元数据、并可按观测流量自适应调整模型的机器学习检测方法,性能持平或优于现有方法且更易部署、可解释。
摘要:
攻击者和寻求隐蔽性的合法渗透测试人员经常使用现成的命令与控制软件。除其他功能外,这些工具支持自定义其网络流量,使其能够模仿流行网站,从而提高其隐蔽性。Cobalt Strike 是此类解决方案中最著名的工具之一,被“Mustang Panda”或“Nobelium”等已知高级攻击组织使用。为应对这些威胁,安全运营中心和其他防御方在检测命令与控制流量方面面临困难,这类流量通常使用 TLS 等加密协议。已有研究提出基于网络流量元数据的机器学习方法,用于检测加密恶意软件通信或对 Tor 网络上的网站进行指纹识别。本文提出一种基于机器学习的方法,仅依赖广泛使用的网络流量元数据来检测 Cobalt Strike 命令与控制活动。据作者所知,所提方法是首个能够根据所观测流量调整其所用模型以优化性能的同类方法。这一特性使该方法在使用标准特征的同时,能够达到与现有最优技术相当或更好的表现。因此,该方法更易于在生产环境中使用,并且具有更强的可解释性。
英文摘要:
Off-the-shelf software for Command and Control is often used by attackers and legitimate pentesters looking for discretion. Among other functionalities, these tools facilitate the customization of their network traffic so it can mimic popular websites, thereby increasing their secrecy. Cobalt Strike is one of the most famous solutions in this category, used by known advanced attacker groups such as "Mustang Panda" or "Nobelium". In response to these threats, Security Operation Centers and other defense actors struggle to detect Command and Control traffic, which often use encryption protocols such as TLS. Network traffic metadata-based machine learning approaches have been proposed to detect encrypted malware communications or fingerprint websites over Tor network. This paper presents a machine learning-based method to detect Cobalt Strike Command and Control activity based only on widely used network traffic metadata. The proposed method is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind that is able to adapt the model it uses to the observed traffic to optimize its performance. This specificity permits our method to performs equally or better than the state of the art while using standard features. Our method is thus easier to use in a production environment and more explainable.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。