论风险市场的单调完备化：不完备风险市场的极限结果
On monotone completion of risk markets: Limit results for incomplete risk markets
AI总结：
针对不完备风险市场中风险厌恶参与者的竞争均衡与福利优化问题，本文提出一种迭代完备化市场的机制，在单调提升福利的同时实现市场完备化。
摘要：
我们考虑一个由风险厌恶参与者组成的竞争市场。假设参与者的风险由Artzner等人（1999）引入的一致风险度量来衡量。福利经济学基本定理早已确立了竞争均衡与系统福利优化之间的等价性（参见，例如，Samuelson（1947））。这些结果已在Ralph和Smeers（2015）中扩展到具有完备风险市场的风险厌恶参与者情形。在本文中，我们考虑不完备市场中的风险交易，并引入一种机制来迭代地完备市场，同时单调地提升福利。
英文摘要：
We consider a competitive market with risk-averse participants. We assume that agents' risks are measured by coherent risk measures introduced by Artzner et al. (1999). Fundamental theorems of welfare economics have long established the equivalence of competitive equilibria and system welfare optimization (see, e.g., Samuelson (1947)). These have been extended to the case of risk-averse agents with complete risk markets in Ralph and Smeers (2015). In this paper, we consider risk trading in incomplete markets and introduce a mechanism to complete the market iteratively while monotonically enhancing welfare.
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