SCAM: A Real-World Typographic Robustness Evaluation for Multimodal Foundation Models
BLISS e.V.(BLISS协会);Berliner Hochschule für Technik (BHT)(柏林技术大学);Technische Universität Berlin(柏林技术大学);KI Werkstatt, Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin (HTW)(柏林技术经济学院);Merantix Momentum(Merantix Momentum公司);Fraunhofer Heinrich-Hertz-Institut, Berlin, Germany(柏林弗劳恩霍夫 Heinrich-Hertz 研究所)
Justus Westerhoff, Erblina Purelku, Jakob Hackstein, Jonas Loos, Leo Pinetzki, Erik Rodner, Lorenz Hufe
Typographic attacks exploit the interplay between text and visual content in multimodal foundation models, causing misclassifications when misleading text is embedded within images. Existing datasets are limited in size and diversity, making it difficult to study such vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce SCAM, the largest and most diverse dataset of real-world typographic attack images to date, containing 1162 images across hundreds of object categories and attack words. Through extensive benchmarking of Vision-Language Models on SCAM, we demonstrate that typographic attacks significantly degrade performance, and identify that training data and model architecture influence the susceptibility to these attacks. Our findings indicate that typographic attacks remain effective against state-of-the-art Large Vision-Language Models, especially those employing vision encoders inherently vulnerable to such attacks. However, employing larger Large Language Model backbones reduces this vulnerability while simultaneously enhancing typographic understanding. Additionally, we demonstrate that synthetic attacks closely resemble real-world (handwritten) attacks, validating their use in research. Our work provides a comprehensive resource and empirical insights to facilitate future research toward robust and trustworthy multimodal AI systems. Finally, we publicly release the datasets introduced in this paper, along with the code for evaluations under www.bliss.berlin/research/scam.
PiCo: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models via Pictorial Code Contextualization
School of Artificial Intelligence, Wuhan University(武汉大学人工智能学院);School of Electronic and Computer Engineering, Peking University(北京大学电子与计算机工程学院);Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence(北京人工智能研究院)
StructBreak: Structural Cognitive Overload-Induced Safety Failures in MLLMs
Key Laboratory of Trustworthy Distributed Computing and Service (MoE), Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(可信分布式计算与服务重点实验室(MoE),北京邮电大学);Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院计算技术研究所)
Technical Report on the CVPR 2026@AdvML Workshop Challenge
Beihang University(北京航空航天大学);University of Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院大学);Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院计算技术研究所);Tongji University(同济大学);iFLYTEK Co., Ltd.(科大讯飞股份有限公司);Anhui Laboratory for Safe Artificial Intelligence in the Yangtze River Delta(长三角安全人工智能安徽实验室);Wenzhou Business College(温州商学院);Jiangnan University(江南大学);Guangzhou City University of Technology(广州理工学院);Inceptio Technology(智元机器);Institute of Dataspace(数据空间研究所);Zhongguancun Laboratory(中关村实验室);Tsinghua University(清华大学);ETH Zürich(苏黎世联邦理工学院);University of Oxford(牛津大学);Shanghai AI Laboratory(上海人工智能实验室);BAAI(北京智源人工智能研究院);Meta;Johns Hopkins University(约翰·霍普金斯大学);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学)
Exploring Adversarial Robustness and Safety Alignment in Multilingual Multi-Modal Large Language Models
Mohamed Bin Zayed University of AI, UAE(穆罕默德·本·扎耶德人工智能大学,阿联酋);Khalifa University, UAE(卡比拉大学,阿联酋);Australian National University, Australia(澳大利亚国立大学,澳大利亚)