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arXiv 2502.12969cs.CY
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生成式人工智能与信息不对称:对逆向选择和道德风险的影响

Generative AI and Information Asymmetry: Impacts on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

The Chinese University Of Hongkong(香港中文大学);University of Bologna(博洛尼亚大学)

Yukun Zhang, Tianyang Zhang

AI总结:

本研究通过将生成式AI信号纳入委托-代理模型,证明其能有效缓解逆向选择和道德风险,提升市场效率与社会福利,并为政策制定提供实践指导。

摘要:

信息不对称常常导致经济市场中的逆向选择和道德风险,造成效率低下和福利损失。解决这些问题的传统方法,如信号传递和筛选,往往不够充分。本研究探讨生成式人工智能如何创建详细的信息信号,帮助委托人更好地理解代理人的类型并监控其行为。通过将这些AI生成的信号纳入委托-代理模型,本研究旨在减少效率低下并改进合同设计。通过理论分析和模拟,我们证明生成式人工智能能够有效缓解逆向选择和道德风险,从而实现更高效的市场结果并增加社会福利。此外,研究结果为政策制定者和行业利益相关者提供了关于负责任地实施生成式人工智能解决方案以提升市场绩效的实践见解。

英文摘要:

Information asymmetry often leads to adverse selection and moral hazard in economic markets, causing inefficiencies and welfare losses. Traditional methods to address these issues, such as signaling and screening, are frequently insufficient. This research investigates how Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) can create detailed informational signals that help principals better understand agents' types and monitor their actions. By incorporating these AI-generated signals into a principal-agent model, the study aims to reduce inefficiencies and improve contract designs. Through theoretical analysis and simulations, we demonstrate that Generative AI can effectively mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard, resulting in more efficient market outcomes and increased social welfare. Additionally, the findings offer practical insights for policymakers and industry stakeholders on the responsible implementation of Generative AI solutions to enhance market performance.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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