应急响应的主要目标之一是帮助组织或系统所有者快速识别并阻止攻击,以尽量减少被攻击系统遭受的损害(和经济损失)。典型的应急响应在很大程度上依赖于系统在攻击期间捕获的日志信息,并且在必要时可能需要将受害系统与网络隔离,以避免进一步的破坏性攻击。然而,现实中存在这样的情况:应急响应团队没有足够的日志记录/信息来识别攻击及其来源,同时受攻击的系统由于服务要求(零停机在线系统,例如在线游戏网站)而不能被停止。典型的应急响应程序和行业标准并未提供充分的解决方案来应对这种场景。在本文中,受一个真实案例的启发,我们提出了一种名为“攻击驱动的应急响应与防御系统(ADIRDS)”的解决方案来解决这一问题。ADIRDS 是一种与真实系统一同运行的在线监控系统。通过将真实系统建模为图,系统中的关键节点/资产受到密切监控。不依赖原始日志系统,而是从攻击技术的角度收集证据。为了转移风险,部署了与真实系统具有非常相似业务背景的现实蜜罐来诱捕攻击者。我们成功地将该系统应用于一个真实案例。基于我们的实验,我们验证了我们设计现实蜜罐的新方法是有效的,共捕获了 38 个唯一的攻击者 IP 地址。我们还将我们的现实蜜罐与文献中提出的低交互和高交互蜜罐的性能进行了比较,结果表明我们提出的蜜罐能够成功欺骗攻击者攻击我们的蜜罐,这验证了我们的蜜罐更为有效。
英文摘要:
One of the major goals of incident response is to help an organization or a system owner to quickly identify and halt the attacks to minimize the damages (and financial loss) to the system being attacked. Typical incident responses rely very much on the log information captured by the system during the attacks and if needed, may need to isolate the victim from the network to avoid further destructive attacks. However, there are real cases that there are insufficient log records/information for the incident response team to identify the attacks and their origins while the attacked system cannot be stopped due to service requirements (zero downtime online systems) such as online gaming sites. Typical incident response procedures and industrial standards do not provide an adequate solution to address this scenario. In this paper, being motivated by a real case, we propose a solution, called "Attack-Driven Incident Response and Defense System (ADIRDS)" to tackle this problem. ADIRDS is an online monitoring system to run with the real system. By modeling the real system as a graph, critical nodes/assets of the system are closely monitored. Instead of relying on the original logging system, evidence will be collected from the attack technique perspectives. To migrate the risks, realistic honeypots with very similar business context as the real system are deployed to trap the attackers. We successfully apply this system to a real case. Based on our experiments, we verify that our new approach of designing the realistic honeypots is effective, 38 unique attacker's IP addresses were captured. We also compare the performance of our realistic honey with both low and high interactive honeypots proposed in the literature, the results found that our proposed honeypot can successfully cheat the attackers to attack our honeypot, which verifies that our honeypot is more effective.
An Unsupervised Learning Approach For A Reliable Profiling Of Cyber Threat Actors Reported Globally Based On Complete Contextual Information Of Cyber Attacks
International Islamic University(国际伊斯兰大学);Seoul National University(首尔大学)
Safeguarding connected autonomous vehicle communication: Protocols, intra- and inter-vehicular attacks and defenses
University of North Texas(北得克萨斯大学);Kennesaw State University(肯尼索州立大学);Fordham University(福特汉姆大学);University of Guelph(圭尔夫大学);Howard University(霍华德大学);Mohamed Bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI)(穆罕默德·本·扎耶德人工智能大学);Qatar University(卡塔尔大学);Hamad Bin Khalifa University(哈马德·本·哈利法大学)
Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore(新加坡国立大学计算机科学系);School of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore(新加坡管理学院计算机与信息系统学院)
The Signalgate Case is Waiving a Red Flag to All Organizational and Behavioral Cybersecurity Leaders, Practitioners, and Researchers: Are We Receiving the Signal Amidst the Noise?
Pamplin College Business, Virginia Tech(弗吉尼亚理工大学潘普林商学院);College of Business at UNLV(内华达大学拉斯维加斯分校商学院)
From Prompt Injections to Protocol Exploits: Threats in LLM-Powered AI Agents Workflows
Department of Computer and Network Engineering, College of Information Technology, United Arab Emirates University(阿联酋大学计算机与网络工程系);Technology Innovation Institute(技术创新研究所);Eötvös Loránd University(埃奥瓦大学);Department of Computer Science, Guelma University(古尔马大学计算机科学系);De Montfort University(德蒙福特大学);Khalifa University of Science and Technology(卡里玛科学技术大学)