近期,使用图神经网络(GNNs)检测网络攻击已展现出可喜的成果。利用这些技术的现有最先进模型大多需要标签样本,而这在许多现实场景中难以获取。为解决此问题,无监督学习和自监督学习(SSL)作为降低对标签数据依赖的有效方法应运而生。然而,这些方法往往更倾向于产生异常检测算法,而非有效的攻击检测系统。本文提出了Few Edges Are Enough(FEAE),这是一种基于GNN的架构,通过结合SSL和少样本学习(FSL)进行训练,以更好地区分误报异常和实际攻击。为最大化少样本样本的潜力,我们的模型采用混合自监督目标,结合了基于对比和基于重构的SSL的优势。仅利用少量标签攻击事件(表示为攻击边),FEAE在两个知名网络数据集上取得了有竞争力的性能,可与监督和无监督方法相媲美。值得注意的是,实验结果表明,在数据集中每种攻击类型仅使用1个恶意事件,就足以实现显著的性能提升。FEAE不仅优于自监督GNN基线,在其中一数据集上甚至超越了部分监督方法。
英文摘要:
Detecting cyberattacks using Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) has seen promising results recently. Most of the state-of-the-art models that leverage these techniques require labeled examples, hard to obtain in many real-world scenarios. To address this issue, unsupervised learning and Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) have emerged as interesting approaches to reduce the dependency on labeled data. Nonetheless, these methods tend to yield more anomalous detection algorithms rather than effective attack detection systems. This paper introduces Few Edges Are Enough (FEAE), a GNN-based architecture trained with SSL and Few-Shot Learning (FSL) to better distinguish between false positive anomalies and actual attacks. To maximize the potential of few-shot examples, our model employs a hybrid self-supervised objective that combines the advantages of contrastive-based and reconstruction-based SSL. By leveraging only a minimal number of labeled attack events, represented as attack edges, FEAE achieves competitive performance on two well-known network datasets compared to both supervised and unsupervised methods. Remarkably, our experimental results unveil that employing only 1 malicious event for each attack type in the dataset is sufficient to achieve substantial improvements. FEAE not only outperforms self-supervised GNN baselines but also surpasses some supervised approaches on one of the datasets.
A Grassmannian Approach to Zero-Shot Learning for Network Intrusion Detection
Institute of Systems and Robotics (ISR)(系统与机器人研究所);University of Coimbra(科英布拉大学);CISUC, Department of Informatics Engineering, University of Coimbra(科英布拉大学信息工程系CISUC);College of Computer Science and Technology, Henan Polytechnic University(河南理工大学计算机科学与技术学院);Department of Mathematics(数学系)
网络入侵检测中的一个主要问题是新攻击的不断增加,使得没有足够的标记样本来识别新的攻击类型。传统的机器学习方法很难解决这样的问题。这可以通过零样本学习来克服,这是计算机视觉领域的一种新方法,可以分为两个阶段:属性学习和推理阶段。提出了一种新的网络入侵检测推理阶段算法。为了实现这一目标,我们首先提出了一个实验装置,用于评估网络入侵检测相关任务中的零样本学习。其次,在AL阶段应用基于决策树的算法提取用于生成属性的规则。最后,使用Zero-Shot类的表示作为格拉斯曼流形中的点,该流形中的点之间的最短距离的显式公式可以用于计算表示新攻击的Zero-Shot类与对应于攻击类别的已知类之间的测地线距离。在KDD Cup 99和NSL-KDD数据集上的实验结果表明,我们的方法与零样本学习成功地解决了网络入侵检测问题。
Detection of Adversarial Supports in Few-shot Classifiers Using Self-Similarity and Filtering
ST Engineering-SUTD Cyber Security Laboratory(ST Engineering-新加坡科技设计大学网络安全实验室);Singapore University of Technology and Design(新加坡科技设计大学);Ben-Gurion University(本-古里安大学);University of Oslo(奥斯陆大学)
Fine-tuning Is Not Enough: A Simple yet Effective Watermark Removal Attack for DNN Models
College of Computer Science, Chongqing University, China(重庆大学计算机学院);School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore(南洋理工大学计算机科学与工程学院);Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University, China(清华大学网络科学与网络空间研究院);The Bradley Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech(弗吉尼亚理工大学布拉德利电子与计算机工程系)
Automatic Attack Discovery for Few-Shot Class-Incremental Learning via Large Language Models
School of Computer and Communication Engineering(计算机与通信工程学院);School of Information and Communication(信息与通信学院);University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(电子科学与技术大学);Department of Strategic and Advanced Interdisciplinary Research(战略与先进跨学科研究部);Pengcheng Laboratory(鹏城实验室)
A Zero-Shot based Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection System
The National Engineering Laboratory for Big Data System Computing Technology(大数据系统计算技术国家工程实验室);College of Computer Science and Software Engineering(计算机科学与软件工程学院);Shenzhen University(深圳大学)
Silent Sabotage During Fine-Tuning: Few-Shot Rationale Poisoning of Compact Medical LLMs
Department of Electronics Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China(清华大学电子工程系);College of AI, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China(清华大学人工智能学院);Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology, Beijing, China(北京信息科学国家研究中心)
When cheap gradients fail: the measurement cost of attacking quantum classifiers
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Melbourne(墨尔本大学电气与电子工程系);School of Computing and Information Systems, University of Melbourne(墨尔本大学计算机与信息系统学院)
Semantic Intent Fragmentation: A Single-Shot Compositional Attack on Multi-Agent AI Pipelines
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at El Paso(德克萨斯理工大学计算机科学系);School of Computing, Southern Illinois University Carbondale(南方伊利诺伊大学卡本代尔分校计算机学院);Hanyang University(翰阳大学);University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校)
Shortcuts Arising from Contrast: Effective and Covert Clean-Label Attacks in Prompt-Based Learning
School of Electronic Engineering(电子工程学院);Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(北京邮电大学);Centre for Frontier AI Research (CFAR)(前沿人工智能研究中心);Institute of High Performance Computing (IHPC)(高性能计算研究所);Agency for Science Technology and Research (A*STAR)(新加坡科技研究局);School of Information and Communication(信息与通信学院)
MetaAdvDet: Towards Robust Detection of Evolving Adversarial Attacks
Tsinghua University(清华大学);Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology (BNRist)(北京信息科学与技术国家研究中心(BNRist));JD AI Research(京东人工智能研究院);Shanghai University(上海大学)