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arXiv 2501.16619cs.CRcs.SYeess.SY
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SHIELD:一种基于深度文件系统特征的宿主无关勒索软件检测框架

SHIELD: A Host-Independent Framework for Ransomware Detection using Deep Filesystem Features

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tandon School of Engineering, New York University(纽约大学坦顿工程学院电气与计算机工程系)

Md Raz, Venkata Sai Charan Putrevu, Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Farshad Khorrami, Ramesh Karri

AI总结:

SHIELD通过深度文件系统特征实现宿主无关的勒索软件检测,利用机器学习在存储控制器中实时检测和缓解威胁。

摘要:

勒索软件的日益复杂化要求具有抗篡改性、脱离宿主的检测解决方案,能够捕捉超出受感染操作系统范围的深层磁盘活动。现有的检测系统使用宿主/内核信号或依赖于粗略的块I/O统计信息,这些方法容易被规避并遗漏文件系统语义。文件系统层本身仍被视为稳健指标的来源,用于存储控制器级别的防御。为此,我们提出了SHIELD:一种安全的宿主无关可扩展度量记录框架,用于防篡改检测和实时缓解勒索软件威胁。SHIELD解析并记录文件系统层面的特征,这些特征无法被规避或混淆,以暴露深层磁盘活动,用于实时基于机器学习的检测和缓解。我们通过使用二元(良性vs.恶意行为)和多类(勒索软件种类识别)分类器的实验来评估这些度量的有效性。在跨不同勒索软件家族的评估中,最佳二元分类器在识别恶意磁盘行为方面的准确率达到97.29%。一个不包含所有传输层度量的硬件-only特征集保留了95.97%的准确率,证实了其在存储控制器数据路径中FPGA/ASIC部署的可行性。在概念验证的闭环部署中,SHIELD在几十次磁盘操作内停止磁盘操作,将受影响的目标文件限制在小于0.4%的范围内,而在小的操作窗口内对零样本种类的勒索软件,同时保持较低的误报率(<3.6%)在未见过的良性应用程序上。结果表明,基于文件系统的、脱离宿主的遥测能够实现准确且稳健的勒索软件检测,包括间歇性/部分加密,并且可以用于嵌入式集成在存储控制器或与其他防御机制结合使用。

英文摘要:

Ransomware's escalating sophistication necessitates tamper-resistant, off-host detection solutions that capture deep disk activity beyond the reach of a compromised operating system. Existing detection systems use host/kernel signals or rely on coarse block-I/O statistics, which are easy to evade and miss filesystem semantics. The filesystem layer itself remains underexplored as a source of robust indicators for storage-controller-level defense. To address this, we present SHIELD: a Secure Host-Independent Extensible Metric Logging Framework for Tamper-Proof Detection and Real-Time Mitigation of Ransomware Threats. SHIELD parses and logs filesystem-level features that cannot be evaded or obfuscated to expose deep disk activity for real-time ML-based detection and mitigation. We evaluate the efficacy of these metrics through experiments with both binary (benign vs. malicious behavior) and multiclass (ransomware strain identification) classifiers. In evaluations across diverse ransomware families, the best binary classifier achieves 97.29% accuracy in identifying malicious disk behavior. A hardware-only feature set that excludes all transport-layer metrics retains 95.97% accuracy, confirming feasibility for FPGA/ASIC deployment within the storage controller datapath. In a proof-of-concept closed-loop deployment, SHIELD halts disk operations within tens of disk actions, limiting targeted files affected to <0.4% for zero-shot strains at small action-windows, while maintaining low false-positive rates (<3.6%) on unseen benign applications. Results demonstrate that filesystem-aware, off-host telemetry enables accurate, resilient ransomware detection, including intermittent/partial encryption, and is practical for embedded integration in storage controllers or alongside other defense mechanisms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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