拉丁方约束下的资源分配
Resource Allocation under the Latin Square Constraint
AI总结:
本研究提出拉丁方约束下的n个不可分割物品n轮分配问题,证明功利主义与平等主义社会福利最大化相关问题的NP难性,并给出近似算法与固定参数可处理算法,同时验证多种公平性分配存在性判定的NP难性。
摘要:
拉丁方是一种由n个不同符号填充的n×n矩阵,每个符号在每行和每列中都恰好出现一次。我们提出了一个在n轮内将n个不可分割物品分配给n个智能体、同时满足拉丁方约束的问题。该约束确保每个智能体每轮最多获得一个物品,且每个物品最多分配给每个智能体一次。每个智能体对物品-轮次对具有可加估值。调度、资源管理和实验设计等现实应用需要拉丁方约束来满足分配的公平性或均衡性。我们的目标是找到一种部分或完全分配方案,最大化智能体估值之和(功利主义社会福利)或智能体估值的最小值(平等主义社会福利)。对于最大化功利主义社会福利的问题,我们证明了即使估值是二元可加的,该问题也是NP难的。随后,我们分别针对部分设置和完全设置提出了(1-1/e)和(1-1/e)/4近似算法。此外,我们针对部分和完全设置,提出了关于拉丁方阶数和最优值的固定参数可处理(FPT)算法。对于最大化平等主义社会福利的问题,我们证实:即使在估值为二元的情况下,对于部分和完全设置,判断最优值至多为1还是至少为2都是NP难的。此外,我们证明了即使在估值相同的情况下,检查是否存在满足无嫉妒、比例性、均等性、任意物品级无嫉妒、任意物品级比例性或任意物品级均等性中任一性质的完全分配,也都是NP难的。
英文摘要:
A Latin square is an $n \times n$ matrix filled with $n$ distinct symbols, each of which appears exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column. We introduce a problem of allocating $n$ indivisible items among $n$ agents over $n$ rounds while satisfying the Latin square constraint. This constraint ensures that each agent receives no more than one item per round and receives each item at most once. Each agent has an additive valuation on the item--round pairs. Real-world applications like scheduling, resource management, and experimental design require the Latin square constraint to satisfy fairness or balancedness in allocation. Our goal is to find a partial or complete allocation that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations (utilitarian social welfare) or the minimum of the agents' valuations (egalitarian social welfare). For the problem of maximizing utilitarian social welfare, we prove NP-hardness even when the valuations are binary additive. We then provide $(1-1/e)$ and $(1-1/e)/4$-approximation algorithms for partial and complete settings, respectively. Additionally, we present fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithms with respect to the order of Latin square and the optimum value for both partial and complete settings. For the problem of maximizing egalitarian social welfare, we establish that deciding whether the optimum value is at most $1$ or at least $2$ is NP-hard for both the partial and complete settings, even when the valuations are binary. Furthermore, we demonstrate that checking the existence of a complete allocation that satisfies each of envy-free, proportional, equitable, envy-free up to any good, proportional up to any good, or equitable up to any good is NP-hard, even when the valuations are identical.
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