arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2501.04183cs.PL
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用于常量时间分析的反编译

Decompiling for Constant-Time Analysis

MPI-SP(马克斯·普朗克软件系统研究所);IMDEA Software Institute(IMDEA软件研究所);ENS Paris-Saclay(巴黎萨克雷高等师范学院);TU Braunschweig(布伦瑞克工业大学)

Santiago Arranz-Olmos, Gilles Barthe, Lionel Blatter, Youcef Bouzid, Sören van der Wall, Zhiyuan Zhang

AI总结:

研究CT编程中确保汇编代码符合规范的问题,核心方法是探讨反编译然后分析(DtA)方法,主要贡献包括揭示现有误判问题、定义CT透明性概念及方法、扩展到推测性CT并构建实用工具。

摘要:

CT编程规范常用于保护加密库免受侧信道攻击。然而,编写CT代码困难,编译器也可能引入CT违规。因此确保汇编代码是CT很重要。一种方法是证明源程序是CT且编译能保持CT。本文探讨了反编译然后分析(DtA)方法在方法学上的合理性和可扩展性。当前反编译机会在CT分析前消除CT漏洞,导致非CT程序被误判为CT,本文给出了被两个流行CT分析工具误判的示例。在方法学方面,定义了CT透明性概念,给出证明转换是CT透明的通用方法。还将CT透明性扩展到推测性CT。在实践方面,构建了基于流行的基于LLVM的反编译器RETDEC的CT透明版本,并将其与现有CT验证工具CT-LLVM结合。

英文摘要:

The CT programming discipline is commonly used to protect cryptographic libraries against side-channel attacks. However, it is hard to write CT code; moreover, compilers can introduce CT violations. Therefore, it is important to ensure that assembly code is CT. One approach is to show that source programs are CT, and that CT is preserved by compilation. In this paper, we explore the methodological soundness and scalability of the Decompile-then-Analyze (DtA) approach, a less conventional alternative that has been suggested in the broader setting of static analysis. Informally, the DtA approach uses decompilers a front-end for static analysis tools. As a motivation for our study, we show that current decompilers eliminate CT vulnerabilities before CT analysis, leading to non-CT programs being accepted as CT. Independently, we provide *constructed* examples of non-CT, exploitable, programs that are accepted by two popular CT analysis tools; in both cases the culprit are program transformations that are used internally prior to CT analysis and eliminate CT violations. While our examples do not invalidate the general approach of these tools, they emphasize the need for studying the DtA approach. On the methodological side, we define the notion of *CT transparency*. Informally, a program transformation is CT transparent if does not eliminate nor introduce CT violations. We also provide general methods for proving that a transformation is CT transparent, and show that several transformations of interest are transparent. We also sketch an extension of CT transparency to speculative CT, which is used by cryptographic software as a protection against Spectre attacks. On the practical side, we build a CT-transparent version of the popular LLVM-based decompiler RETDEC, and combine it with CT-LLVM, an existing CT verification...

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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