保障 Wi-Fi 6 连接建立过程免受中继与欺骗威胁
Securing Wi-Fi 6 Connection Establishment Against Relay and Spoofing Threats
AI总结:
本文提出一种在 Wi-Fi 6 物理层前导码中嵌入数字签名并施加时间约束的向后兼容方案,以对抗连接建立阶段的中继与欺骗攻击,并通过 USRP 测试平台验证其检测真阳性率达 96-100%。
摘要:
无线局域网在连接建立(CE)阶段仍然容易受到攻击。当前的 Wi-Fi 安全协议无法完全缓解中间人攻击、前导码欺骗和中继等攻击。为了强化 CE 阶段,本文设计了一种向后兼容的方案,在物理(PHY)层将数字签名交织到前导码中,并施加时间约束,以有效对抗这些攻击。该方法将 MAC 层签名切片,并将切片嵌入 CE 帧前导码中,而不扩展帧长度,从而允许一个或多个站点同时验证其各自接入点(AP)的传输。通过使站点分析 PHY 层头部的一致模式,并识别接收到的帧是否为来自预期 AP 的预期帧,实现了对并发 CE 的支持,无需检查 MAC 层头部即可达到 100% 的准确率。此外,我们设计并实现了一种快速中继攻击,以挑战我们所提出的防御方案并确定其有效性。我们扩展了现有的开源工具以支持 IEEE 802.11ax,在由 USRP、商用 AP 和 Wi-Fi 设备组成的测试平台上评估了所提方案的有效性和实用性,结果表明我们的中继攻击检测达到了 96-100% 的真阳性率。最后,端到端的形式化安全分析证实了所提解决方案的安全性和正确性。
英文摘要:
Wireless local area networks remain vulnerable to attacks initiated during the connection establishment (CE) phase. Current Wi-Fi security protocols fail to fully mitigate attacks like man-in-the-middle, preamble spoofing, and relaying. To fortify the CE phase, in this paper we design a backward-compatible scheme using a digital signature interwoven into the preambles at the physical (PHY) layer with time constraints to effectively counter those attacks. This approach slices a MAC-layer signature and embeds the slices within CE frame preambles without extending frame size, allowing one or multiple stations to concurrently verify their respective APs' transmissions. The concurrent CEs are supported by enabling the stations to analyze the consistent patterns of PHY-layer headers and identify whether the received frames are the anticipated ones from the expected APs, achieving 100% accuracy without needing to examine their MAC-layer headers. Additionally, we design and implement a fast relay attack to challenge our proposed defense and determine its effectiveness. We extend existing open-source tools to support IEEE 802.11ax to evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of our proposed scheme in a testbed consisting of USRPs, commercial APs, and Wi-Fi devices, and we show that our relay attack detection achieves 96-100% true positive rates. Finally, end-to-end formal security analyses confirm the security and correctness of the proposed solution.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。