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arXiv 2410.23705econ.GNq-fin.EC
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经济冲击、机会成本与政治供给

Economic Shocks, Opportunity Costs, and the Supply of Politicians

Columbia University(哥伦比亚大学)

Laura Barros, Aiko Schmeißer

AI总结:

本文研究了经济冲击如何通过降低个人机会成本,促进更多人进入政治领域,并提高了政治候选人的质量。

摘要:

不利的经济冲击被证实会重塑选民行为——政治需求侧。然而,关于它们对供给侧的影响知之甚少:这样的冲击如何影响谁成为政治家。本文研究了失业如何影响个人进入政治的决定以及对政治选拔的影响。利用将政治参与记录与匹配的雇主-员工数据连接起来的行政数据,涵盖巴西所有正式工人,并利用大规模裁员进行因果识别,我们发现失业显著增加了加入政党的可能性和竞选地方职位的可能。由裁员引发的候选人在全国各种能力指标上被积极选择,表明经济冲击可以提高政治候选人的质量。候选人数量的增加在那些从担任公职中获得更大财务激励和预测收入损失更高的被裁员者中最为显著。进一步的回归不连续设计显示,获得失业救济金资格会增加政治参与。这些结果与个体机会成本的减少一致——无论是减少私人部门收入还是增加时间资源——都促进了更大的政治参与。

英文摘要:

Adverse economic shocks are known to reshape voter behavior -- the demand side of politics. Much less is known about their consequences for the supply side: how such shocks affect who becomes a politician. This paper examines how job losses influence individuals' decisions to enter politics and the implications for political selection. Using administrative data linking political participation records to matched employer-employee data covering all formal workers in Brazil, and exploiting mass layoffs for causal identification, we find that job loss significantly increases the likelihood of joining a political party and running for local office. Layoff-induced candidates are positively selected on various competence measures, indicating that economic shocks can improve the quality of political entrants. The increase in candidacies is strongest among laid-off individuals with greater financial incentives from holding office and higher predicted income losses. A regression discontinuity design further shows that eligibility for unemployment benefits increases political entry. These results are consistent with a reduction in individuals' opportunity costs -- both in terms of reduced private-sector income and increased time resources -- facilitating greater political engagement.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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