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arXiv 2410.18871cs.GTcs.MA
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学习在周期性、库存受限市场中的合谋

Learning Collusion in Episodic, Inventory-Constrained Markets

Paul Friedrich, Barna Pásztor, Giorgia Ramponi

AI总结:

本文研究库存受限易腐商品市场中定价算法的隐性合谋,提出计算价格水平的方法,并证明深度强化学习智能体可学习合谋,分析其策略机制。

摘要:

定价算法已展现出学习隐性合谋的能力,而现行法规对此基本未予处理。它们在市场中的使用日益增多,包括具有合谋历史的寡头垄断行业,这要求竞争当局进行更密切的审查。在本文中,我们将学习算法中隐性合谋的研究从基础定价博弈扩展到更复杂的市场,这些市场的特征是具有固定供应和销售截止日期的易腐商品,例如机票、易腐品和酒店房间。我们在此框架内形式化了合谋,并引入了一种基于竞争(纳什)均衡和合谋(垄断)最优下价格水平的度量。由于这些价格水平不存在解析表达式,我们提出了一种高效的计算方法来推导它们。通过实验,我们证明了深度强化学习智能体能够在这个更复杂的领域中学习合谋。此外,我们分析了这些智能体所采用的合谋策略的底层机制和结构。

英文摘要:

Pricing algorithms have demonstrated the capability to learn tacit collusion that is largely unaddressed by current regulations. Their increasing use in markets, including oligopolistic industries with a history of collusion, calls for closer examination by competition authorities. In this paper, we extend the study of tacit collusion in learning algorithms from basic pricing games to more complex markets characterized by perishable goods with fixed supply and sell-by dates, such as airline tickets, perishables, and hotel rooms. We formalize collusion within this framework and introduce a metric based on price levels under both the competitive (Nash) equilibrium and collusive (monopolistic) optimum. Since no analytical expressions for these price levels exist, we propose an efficient computational approach to derive them. Through experiments, we demonstrate that deep reinforcement learning agents can learn to collude in this more complex domain. Additionally, we analyze the underlying mechanisms and structures of the collusive strategies these agents adopt.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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