与机器人对话：AI、言语行为与断言的边界
Chatting with Bots: AI, Speech Acts, and the Edge of Assertion
AI总结：
本文围绕大语言模型聊天机器人能否断言的问题，梳理支持与反对聊天机器人断言论题（TCA）的依据，指出代理断言、虚构主义两种方案的不足，提出原断言范畴以化解相关两难困境。
摘要：
本文探讨了由大语言模型驱动的聊天机器人是否具备断言能力的问题。根据我们提出的「聊天机器人断言论题（Thesis of Chatbot Assertion, TCA）」，聊天机器人属于能够进行断言的事物，且当前一代聊天机器人生成的输出中至少有一部分可被认定为断言。我们为TCA提供了若干立论依据，认为该论题值得被严肃对待，而非被轻易否定。我们也梳理了近期针对TCA的反对意见，指出这些反对意见具有相当的分量。由此我们面临如下两难困境：如何同时兼顾支持与反对TCA的两类考量？我们考察了应对这一两难的两种有影响力的回应方案——第一种诉诸代理断言（proxy-assertion）概念，第二种诉诸虚构主义（fictionalism），并论证这两种方案均不令人满意。相反，通过反思断言的个体发生过程，我们认为需要为「原断言（proto-assertion）」这一范畴留出空间。随后我们将原断言范畴应用于聊天机器人，论证将聊天机器人视为原断言者能够为聊天机器人断言的两难问题提供令人满意的解决方案。
英文摘要：
This paper addresses the question of whether large language model-powered chatbots are capable of assertion. According to what we call the Thesis of Chatbot Assertion (TCA), chatbots are the kinds of things that can assert, and at least some of the output produced by current-generation chatbots qualifies as assertion. We provide some motivation for TCA, arguing that it ought to be taken seriously and not simply dismissed. We also review recent objections to TCA, arguing that these objections are weighty. We thus confront the following dilemma: how can we do justice to both the considerations for and against TCA? We consider two influential responses to this dilemma - the first appeals to the notion of proxy-assertion; the second appeals to fictionalism - and argue that neither is satisfactory. Instead, reflecting on the ontogenesis of assertion, we argue that we need to make space for a category of proto-assertion. We then apply the category of proto-assertion to chatbots, arguing that treating chatbots as proto-assertors provides a satisfactory resolution to the dilemma of chatbot assertion.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
