隐藏于众目睽睽之下：将硬件木马基准测试重构为捉迷藏式修改
Hiding in Plain Sight: Reframing Hardware Trojan Benchmarking as a Hide&Seek Modification
AI总结：
本文将硬件木马检测形式化为“搜寻者困境”，提出混合无感染与随机感染重构电路的基准，并评估三种检测工具，揭示现有方法存在显著误分类。
摘要：
本工作聚焦于推进硬件设计领域的安全研究，通过正式定义硬件木马（HT）检测这一现实问题。其目标是将HT检测建模得更贴近真实世界，即把该问题描述为“搜寻者困境”：检测智能体不知道电路是否被HT感染。利用这一理论问题表述，我们创建了一个由无HT和感染HT的重构电路混合而成的基准，同时保持它们原有的功能。重构电路被随机植入HT，造成防御者无法确定某个电路是否被感染的情形。我们相信，我们创新的基准及其创建方法将帮助社区通过比较不同方法在电路分类中的成功率来判断其检测质量。我们使用所开发的基准评估了三种最先进的HT检测工具，以展示该方法的基线结果。我们使用主成分分析来评估基准的强度，观察到一些重构的HT感染电路与无HT电路在映射上非常接近，导致检测器出现显著的标签误分类。
英文摘要：
This work focuses on advancing security research in the hardware design space by formally defining the realistic problem of Hardware Trojan (HT) detection. The goal is to model HT detection more closely to the real world, i.e., describing the problem as The Seeker's Dilemma where a detecting agent is unaware of whether circuits are infected by HTs or not. Using this theoretical problem formulation, we create a benchmark that consists of a mixture of HT-free and HT-infected restructured circuits while preserving their original functionalities. The restructured circuits are randomly infected by HTs, causing a situation where the defender is uncertain if a circuit is infected or not. We believe that our innovative benchmark and methodology of creating benchmarks will help the community judge the detection quality of different methods by comparing their success rates in circuit classification. We use our developed benchmark to evaluate three state-of-the-art HT detection tools to show baseline results for this approach. We use Principal Component Analysis to assess the strength of our benchmark, where we observe that some restructured HT-infected circuits are mapped closely to HT-free circuits, leading to significant label misclassification by detectors.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
