推动创新以挫败数据泄露硬件木马：从理论到实践
Propelling Innovation to Defeat Data-Leakage Hardware Trojans: From Theory to Practice
AI总结：
本文提出并实践了RECORD方案，通过组合逻辑临时随机化编码与Quilt Packaging技术，阻止硬件木马建立数据泄露侧信道，从而抵御不可信制造设施中的逆向工程攻击。
摘要：
由于半导体制造成本不断上升，许多设计公司已转向无晶圆厂模式，依赖外部制造设施生产芯片。然而，并非所有这些设施都可信赖；有些可能会注入硬件木马并危及系统安全。硬件木马的一个常见目标是建立用于数据泄露的侧信道。尽管已有大量文献讨论各种防御措施，但几乎所有措施都侧重于阻止侧信道的建立，并且如果攻击者能够接触物理芯片并能在多次制造运行之间进行逆向工程，这些措施就可能被攻破。在本文中，我们将 RECORD（用于抵抗数据泄露的组合逻辑随机化编码）从理论推进到实践。RECORD 是一种新颖的组合逻辑临时随机化编码方案，借助 Quilt Packaging 技术，可防止攻击者解读数据。
英文摘要：
Many design companies have gone fabless and rely on external fabrication facilities to produce chips due to increasing cost of semiconductor manufacturing. However, not all of these facilities can be considered trustworthy; some may inject hardware Trojans and jeopardize the security of the system. One common objective of hardware Trojans is to establish a side channel for data leakage. While extensive literature exists on various defensive measures, almost all of them focus on preventing the establishment of side channels, and can be compromised if attackers gain access to the physical chip and can perform reverse engineering between multiple fabrication runs. In this paper, we advance (from theory to practice) RECORD: Randomized Encoding of COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage. RECORD is a novel scheme of temporarily randomized encoding for combinational logic that, with the aid of Quilt Packaging, prevents attackers from interpreting the data.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
