传统预测竞赛中的对冲与近似真实性
Hedging and Approximate Truthfulness in Traditional Forecasting Competitions
AI总结:
本文首次正式分析预测竞赛传统机制,证明“长期真实性”不成立,最佳预测者可能通过对冲增加获胜概率,但在参赛者对对手和事件结果有充分不确定性时能实现近似真实。
摘要:
在预测竞赛中,传统机制根据每个事件的结果对每位参赛者的预测进行评分,总分最高的参赛者获胜。尽管众所周知传统机制可能存在激励问题,但民间普遍认为,随着事件数量的增加,参赛者仍会大致保持真实。然而,迄今为止,文献缺乏对这种传统机制的正式分析。本文首次给出了此类分析。我们首先证明“长期真实性”的民间说法是错误的:即使对于任意数量的事件,最佳预测者也可能有对冲的激励,即通过报告更温和的信念来增加其获胜概率。然而,在积极方面,我们表明当两名参赛者对对手的相对质量和事件结果具有充分的不确定性时,他们将大致保持真实,这种情况在实践中可能会出现。
英文摘要:
In forecasting competitions, the traditional mechanism scores the predictions of each contestant against the outcome of each event, and the contestant with the highest total score wins. While it is well-known that this traditional mechanism can suffer from incentive issues, it is folklore that contestants will still be roughly truthful as the number of events grows. Yet thus far the literature lacks a formal analysis of this traditional mechanism. This paper gives the first such analysis. We first demonstrate that the ''long-run truthfulness'' folklore is false: even for arbitrary numbers of events, the best forecaster can have an incentive to hedge, reporting more moderate beliefs to increase their win probability. On the positive side, however, we show that two contestants will be approximately truthful when they have sufficient uncertainty over the relative quality of their opponent and the outcomes of the events, a case which may arise in practice.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。